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Abstract
The productivity of firms is, at least partly, determined by a firm’s actions and decisions. One of
these decisions involves the organization of production in terms of the number of hierarchical layers
of management the firm decides to employ. Using detailed employer-employee matched data and firm
production quantity and input data for Portuguese firms, we study the endogenous response of quantity-
based and revenue-based productivity to firm reorganizations measured by changes in the number of
management layers. We show that as a result of an exogenous demand or productivity shock that makes
the firm reorganize and add a management layer, quantity-based productivity increases by about 6%, while
revenue-based productivity drops by around 3%. Such a reorganization makes the firm more productive,
but also increases the quantity produced to an extent that lowers the price charged by the firm and, as a
result, its revenue-based productivity.
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1 Introduction
A firm’s productivity depends on the way it organizes production. The decisions of its owners and managers
on how to combine different inputs and factors of production with particular technologies, given demand
for their product, determine the production effi ciency of the firm. Clearly, these decision makers face
many constraints and random disturbances. Random innovations or disruptions, regulatory uncertainties,
changes in tastes and fads, among many other idiosyncratic shocks, are undoubtedly partly responsible for
fluctuations in firm productivity. However, these random —and perhaps exogenous—productivity or demand
fluctuations also result in firm responses that change the way production is organized, thereby affecting its
measured productivity. For example, a sudden increase in demand due to a product becoming fashionable
can lead a firm to expand and add either a plant, a more complex management structure, a new division,
or a new building. These investments are lumpy and, as such, will change the firm’s production effi ciency
and prices discontinuously as well.
In this paper we study the changes in productivity observed in Portuguese firms when they reorganize
their management structure by adding or dropping layers of management. Consider a firm that wants to
expand as a result of a positive demand shock and decides to add a layer of management (say add another
division and a CEO that manages the whole firm). The new organization is suitable for a larger firm and
lowers the average cost of the firm thereby increasing its quantity-based productivity. Moreover, the switch
to an organizational structure fitted for a larger firm also reduces the marginal cost of the firm leading to
higher quantities and lower prices. Because organizational decisions are lumpy, at the moment of the switch,
the firm will probably have an organizational structure that is still a bit large for its size. The implication
is that changes in organization that add organizational capacity in the form of a new management layer,
lead to increases in quantity-based productivity, but also reductions in revenue-based productivity through
reductions in prices. Hence, the endogenous response of firm productivity to exogenous shocks that trigger
reorganizations can be complex and differ depending on the measure of productivity used.
Using a recently developed measure of changes in organization we show that these patterns are very
much present in the Portuguese data. To illustrate the parallel case when a firm receives a negative shock,
consider the example of a Portuguese firm producing “Knitted and crocheted pullovers, cardigans, and
similar articles”. This firm downsized heavily between 2002 and 2005 as a result of China’s entry into the
WTO and the resulting reduction in quotas and increased import competition. We observe that the quantity
sold by the firm declines by 50%, but its price increases by 35%. The firm reduced its layers of management
by firing several managers and employees performing secondary tasks, and focusing on its main expertise
by maintaining its “sewers and embroiderers”. Overall, its labor forced declines by 27 employees. Using the
measures of productivity we explain in detail below, the result is a reduction in quantity-based productivity
of 53% combined with an increase in revenue-based productivity of 10.3%. The experience and behavior of
this firm is by no means unique. Using many examples and a host of empirical measures, we show that
reorganization and productivity are systematically linked in the way we describe.
2
Although the logic above applies to many types of organizational changes and other lumpy investments,
we explain it in more detail using a knowledge-based hierarchy model that can guide us in our empirical im-
plementation. Furthermore, this model provides an easy way to empirically identify changes in organization
using occupational classifications. The theory of knowledge-based hierarchies was developed in Rosen (1982),
Garicano (2000) and, in an equilibrium context with heterogeneous firms, in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) and Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012, from now on CRH). In particular, we use the model in
CRH since it provides an application of this theory to an economy with firms that face heterogeneous pro-
ductivity and demands for their products. In the context of CRH, we provide novel theoretical results that
characterize the pattern of quantity-based and revenue-based productivity when firms reorganize as a result
of exogenous demand or productivity shocks.
The basic technology is one that requires time and knowledge. Workers use their time to produce
and generate ‘problems’or production possibilities. Output requires solving this problems. Workers have
knowledge that they use to try to solve these problems. If they know how to solve them, they do, and
output is realized. Otherwise they can redirect the problem to a manager one layer above. Such a manager
tries to solve the problem and, if it cannot, can redirect the problem to an even higher-level manager. The
organizational problem of the firm is to determine how much does each employee know, how many of them
to employ, and how many layers of management to use in production.
Using matched employer-employee data for the French manufacturing sector, Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-
Hansberg (2015), from now on CMRH, show how to use occupation data to identify the layers of management
in a firm.1 They show that the theory of knowledge-based hierarchies can rationalize the layer-level changes
in the number of employees and wages as firms grow either with or without changing layers. For example,
as implied by the theory, a reorganization that adds a layer of management leads to increases in the number
of hours employed in each layer but to a reduction in the average wage in each preexisting layer. In
contrast, when firms grow without reorganizing they add hours of work to each layer and they increase the
wages of each worker. This evidence shows that when firms expand and contract they actively manage their
organization by hiring workers with different characteristics. The Portuguese data exhibits the same patterns
that CMRH found for France. Importantly, the detailed input, revenue and quantity data for Portugal allows
us to go a step further and measure the productivity implications of changes in organization.
Measuring productivity well is notoriously complicated and the industrial organization literature has
proposed a variety of techniques to do so (see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, Olley and Pakes, 1996,
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003, Wooldridge, 2009, De Loecker and Warzinsky, 2012, and Ackerberg et al., 2015,
among others). The first issue is whether we want to measure quantity-based or revenue-based productivity.
The distinction is crucial since the former measures how effective is a firm in transforming inputs and factors
into output, while the latter also measures any price variation, perhaps related to markups, that results
from market power. The ability of firms to determine prices due to some level of market power is a reality
1Following CMRH several studies have shown that occupational categories can be used to identify layers of management in
other datasets. For example, Tåg (2013) uses Swedish data and Friedrich (2015) uses Danish data.
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that is hard to abstract from. Particularly when considering changes in scale that make firms move along
their demand curve and change their desired prices.
To measure the effect of organizational change on quantity-based productivity we need a methodology
that can account for demand, markup, and productivity shocks over time and across firms.2 We use the
methodology proposed by Forlani et al., (2015), which from now on we refer to as MULAMA. This method
uses the same cost minimization assumptions as previous methodologies, like De Loecker and Warzinsky
(2012), but makes some relatively strong assumptions on the way demand differs across firms in order to
allow for correlated demand and productivity disturbances. Furthermore, it is amenable to introducing the
organizational structure we described above. Note also that since we focus on changes in quantity-based
productivity as a result of a firm reorganization we can sidestep the diffi culties in comparing quantity-
based productivity across horizontally differentiated products. Using this methodology, and quantity data
available in the Portuguese data, we find that adding (dropping) layers is associated with increases (de-
creases) in quantity-based productivity.3 In addition, we extend the methodology to structurally estimate
revenue-based-productivity and show that adding (dropping) layers is associated with decreases (increases)
in revenue-based productivity, particularly when we properly control for past prices and shocks, as suggested
by the theory.4
Up to this point we have not addressed the issue of causality. The results above only state that adding
layers coincides with increases in quantity-based productivity and declines in revenue-based productivity.
To the extent that organization, like capital infrastructure, cannot adjust much in the short run in the
wake of current period shocks, the above results can be interpreted as causal. We relax this assumption
by using a set of instruments represented by demand and cost shocks predicting organizational changes but
uncorrelated with current productivity shocks. The MULAMA estimation strategy allows us to measure
these past productivity, demand, and markups shocks. We show that our results on both revenue-based and
quantity-based productivity remain large and significant.
Finally, we go one step further, and use the quota removals in sub-industries of the “Textile and Ap-
parel”sector, that resulted from China’s entry into the WTO, as an instrument for a firm’s reorganization.
Focusing on this sector allows us to explore the implications of a clearly exogenous negative demand shock
on reorganization and productivity. In Section 3 we present a couple of detailed examples of individual firms
in this industry where we describe in more detail the way these firms changed their labor force composition
and therefore their organization and productivity. In Section 5.4 we use this exogenous demand shock as
an instrument for the change in layers and apply our general methodology. We find that the behavior of
2See Marschak and Andrews (1944) and Klette and Griliches (1996) for a discussion of the output price bias when calculating
productivity.
3 In Caliendo, et al. (2018), a previous working paper version of this paper, we show that our findings survive a variety of
robustness checks and alternative formulations of the productivity process. For example, we can allow for changes in organization
to have a permanent or only a contemporaneous impact on quantity-based productivity.
4 In Caliendo, et al. (2018), we also find, using a host of different measures of revenue productivity (from value-added per
worker to Olley and Pakes, 1996, Wooldridge, 2009, and De Loecker and Warzinsky, 2012), that adding layers is related to
decreases in revenue-based productivity.
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firms as a result of the reduction in quotas is very much in line with the rest of our findings.5
In sum, in this paper we show that the organizational structure of firms, as measured by their hierarchical
occupational composition, has direct implications on the productivity of firms. As they add organizational
layers, their quantity-based productivity increases, although the corresponding expansion decreases their
revenue productivity as they reduce prices.6 This endogenous component of productivity determines, in
part, the observed heterogeneity in both revenue and quantity-based productivity across firms. Failure to
reorganize in order to grow can, therefore, result in an inability to exploit available productivity improve-
ments. This would imply that firms remain ineffi ciently small, as has been documented in some developing
countries (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014).
The literature on firm organization and productivity is small and only broadly related to fully specified
theories. Gibbons and Henderson (2013) and Bloom and van Reenen (2011) provide nice overviews of the
findings relating organization or human resource management practices and productivity. Studies that focus
on particular industries, like Ichniowski et al (1997), find large effects of certain management practices on
productivity, although Bloom and van Reenen (2011) argue that causality is not always credibly established
and many results only use cross-sectional data or disappear when using time-series variation. Ichniowski
and Shaw (2003) provide a survey of the literature and argue that advances in information technology (IT)
and a skilled labor force seem to generate increases in productivity. Caroli and van Reenen (2001) provides
perhaps the best example of a study that links organizational change to measures of productivity using
detailed firm-level data. Subsequently, Bloom and van Reenen (2011) have credibly established an empirical
link between management practices and productivity, as have Lazear and Shaw (2007) from the perspective
of ‘personnel economics’. Garicano and Hubbard (2016) studies the role of organization on productivity
among law firms and also find large effects. Relative to this literature, we offer a consistent measure of a
characteristic of a firm’s organization: the number of layers.7 Changes in this measure can be interpreted
within a fully-fledged theory of the organization of a firm’s labor force. Furthermore, the theory specifies
the effects that changes in layers should have on revenue versus quantity-based productivity. Our main
contribution in this paper is then to provide a theory-consistent estimation of the effect that this form of
organizational change has on revenue and quantity-based productivity for a large fraction of firms in the
Portuguese economy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a short recap of the knowledge-
hierarchy theory that we use to guide our empirical exploration and describe its implications for productivity.
5 In a related result, Garcia and Voigtländer (2019) find, among new Chilean exporters, a reduction in revenue-based pro-
ductivity and an increase in quantity-based productivity. The mechanism and findings in our paper can be used directly to
rationalize their findings since exporting amounts to a firm revenue shock.
6Our results also relate to the cost pass-through literature given that a reorganization affects cost and, in turn, prices. As
a result, in the paper we also calculate the cost-pass through for all firms (what we refer to as the unconditional measure) and
for firms that change organization (conditional). We find that the unconditional cost pass-through estimates are similar to the
ones in the literature, but that the estimates conditional on firms reorganizing are somewhat larger, as expected.
7Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) also measure changes over time in management layers and relate
them to economic outcomes. They do not, however, link organizational change to structural measures of quantity and revenue-
based productivity.
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We finish this section with several examples of Portuguese firms that went through a process of reorgani-
zation. Section 3 discusses the Portuguese manufacturing data set we use in the paper and presents the
basic characteristics of Portuguese production hierarchies. In particular, we show that firms with different
numbers of layers are in fact different and that changes in the number of layers are associated with the
expected changes in the number of workers and wages at each layer. Section 4 presents the methodology
we use to measure quantity-based and revenue-based productivity. Section 5 presents our main empiri-
cal specifications and results, as well as our results for revenue and quantity-based productivity using the
China textile shock. Section 6 presents a variety of robustness checks and our estimates of aggregate effects.
Section 7 concludes. The appendix includes more details on our data set, a description of all Tables and
Figures, as well as additional derivations and robustness tests of the results in the main text.
2 A Sketch of a Theory of Organization and its Empirical Implications
The theory of knowledge-based hierarchies, initially proposed by Garicano (2000), has been developed using
a variety of alternative assumptions (see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015, for a review). Here we discuss
the version of the technology with homogenous agents and heterogeneous demand developed in CRH.
So consider firm i in period t that faces a Cobb-Douglas technology







with quantity-based productivity Ait, returns to scale given by γ and where Oit denotes the labor input,
Mit material inputs and Kit capital. The parameter αO ≥ 0 represents the expenditure share on the labor
input, αM ≥ 0 on materials and γ − αM − αO on physical capital. The labor input is produced using the
output of a variety of different workers with particular levels of knowledge. The organizational problem is
embedded in this input. That is, we interpret the output of the knowledge hierarchy as generating the labor
input of the firm. Hence, in the rest of this section we focus on the organizational problem of labor and
abstract from capital and materials. We return to the other factors in our estimation of productivity below.
Production of the labor input requires time and knowledge. Agents employed as workers specialize
in production, use their unit of time working in the production floor and use their knowledge to deal
with any problems they face in production. Each unit of time generates a problem, that, if solved yields
one unit of output. Agents employed as managers specialize in problem solving, use h units of time to
familiarize themselves with each problem brought by a subordinate, and solve the problems using their
available knowledge. Problems are drawn from a distribution F (z) with F ′′ (z) < 0. Workers in a firm
know how to solve problems in an interval of knowledge [0, z0L], where the superindex 0 denotes the layer
(0 for workers) and the subindex the total number of management layers in the firm, L. Problems outside
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Market wages simply compensate agents for their cost of acquiring knowledge.
The organizational problem of the firm is to choose the number of workers in each layer, their knowledge
and therefore their wages, and the number of layers. Hence, consider a firm that produces a quantity O of
the labor input. CL (O;w) is the minimum cost of producing a labor input O with an organization with L
layers8 at a prevailing wage schedule w (·), namely,










O ≤ F (ZLL )n0L, (3)
n`L = hn
0
L[1− F (Z`−1L )] for L ≥ ` > 0, (4)
nLL = 1. (5)
The first constraint just states that total production of the labor input should be larger or equal than
O, the second is the time constraint explained above, and the third states that all firms need to be headed
by one CEO. The last constraint is important since it implies that small firms cannot have a small fraction
of the complex organization of a large firm. We discuss bellow the implications of partially relaxing this
constraint. The variable cost function is given by
C (O;w) = min
L≥0
{CL (O;w)} .
CRH show that the average cost function (AC (O;w) = C (O;w) /O) that results from this problem exhibits
the properties depicted in Figure 1 (which we reproduce from CMRH). Namely, it is U-shaped given the
number of layers, with the average cost associated to the minimum effi cient scale that declines as the firm
adds layers. Each point in the average cost curve in the figure correspond to a particular organizational
design. Note that the average cost curve faced by the firm is the lower-envelope of the average cost curves for a
given number of layers. The crossings of these curves determine a set of output thresholds (or correspondingly
demand thresholds9) at which the firms decides to reorganize by changing the number of layers. The overall
average cost, including materials and capital, of a firm that is an input price taker will have exactly the
same shape (given our specification of the production function in equation (1) under γ = 1).
Consider the three dots in the figure, which correspond to firms that face different levels of demand
8Throughout we refer to the number of layers of the firm by the number of management layers. So firms with only workers
have zero layers, firms with workers and managers have 1 layer, etc.
9Note that since output increases (decreases) discontinuously when the firm adds (drops) layers, the average cost curve is
discontinuous as a function of the level of demand λ.
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as parametrized by λ.10 Suppose that after solving the corresponding profit maximization using the cost
function above, a firm that faces a demand level of λ decides to produce Q (λ) (or q (λ) in logs). The top
panel on the right-hand-side of Figure 1 tells us that it will have one layer with 5 workers and one layer
with one manager above them. The figure also indicates the wages of each of them (the height of each bar),





without reorganizing, that is, keeping the same number of layers. The firm expands the number of
workers and it increases their knowledge and wages. The reason is that the one manager needs to hire more
knowledgeable workers, who ask less often, in order to increase her span of control. In contrast, consider




. This firm reorganizes by adding a layer. It also hires more workers at all
preexisting layers. However, it hires less knowledgeable workers, at lower wages, in all preexisting layers.
The reason is that by adding a new layer the firm can avoid paying multiple times for knowledge that is
rarely used by the bottom ranks in the hierarchy. In the next section we show that all these predictions are
confirmed by the data.
Figure 1: Average Cost and Organization
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We can also use Figure 1 to show how the organizational structure changes as we relax the integer
constraint of the top manager, in (5). First, note that at the minimum effi cient scale (MES), which is given
by the minimum of the average cost, having one manager at the top is optimal for the firm. So the constraint
in (5) is not binding. Hence, relaxing the constraint can affect the shape of the average cost function on
segments to the right and to the left of the MES. The reason why average costs rise for quantities other
than MES is that firms are restricted to have one manager at the top. Otherwise, the firm could expand
10 In our examples here we focus on changes in the level of demand. Later on we will further consider changes in the exogenous
component of productivity and changes in markups. Indeed, whatever pushes the firm to change its desired output can affect
a firm’s organizational structure.
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the optimal organizational structure at the MES by just replicating the hierarchy proportionally as it adds
or reduces managers at the top.
For instance, suppose we allow organizations to have more than one manager at the top, namely nLL ≥ 1.
Figure 1 presents dashed lines that depict the shape of the average cost for this case. As we can see, the
average cost is flat for segments to the right of the MES up to the point in which the firm decides to add a
new layer. At the moment of the switch, the average cost starts falling until it reaches the MES and then it
becomes flat again. All the predictions that we discussed before still hold for this case. The only difference
is the way in which firms expand after they reach their MES up to the point in which they reorganize. We
allow for this extra degree of flexibility when we use the structure of the model and take it to the data.11
2.1 Productivity Implications - Theory and Data
In the following section we show that firms that grow or shrink substantially do so by adding or dropping
management layers. These reorganizations also have consequences on the measured productivity of firms.
In the model above quantity-based productivity of a firm in producing the labor input can be measured
as the inverse of the average cost at constant factor prices; namely, Q (λ) /C̄ (Q (λ) ;C (·; 1) , 1, 1) where
C̄ (Q (λ) ;C (·;w) , Pm, r) denotes the overall cost function of the firm and Pm and r the price of materials
and capital. Note that Q (λ) denotes quantity produced and not revenue. Revenue-based productivity is
instead given by P (λ)Q (λ) /C̄ (Q (λ) ;C (·; 1) , 1, 1) where P (λ) denotes the firm’s output price.
Quantity-based productivity increases with an increase in λ when the firm adds layers. The reason is
simply that any voluntary increase in layers is accompanied by an increase in the quantity produced, which
results in a lower average costs for the firm when using the new organizational structure. The firm is only
willing to add an extra layer of management, and hire more managers that do not generate production
possibilities at a higher cost, if it can use the new organization to produce more at a lower average and
marginal cost. Of course, under standard assumptions that lead to a downward sloping demand, the increase
in quantity will also decrease the price that consumers are willing to pay for the good. Note that, since the
firm is choosing the level of λ at which it switches layers, we know that profits will be continuous in λ. This
implies that the increase in revenue has to be identical to the increase in variable costs. Given that, in the
presence of fixed production costs, total revenue has to be larger that variable costs in order for profits to
be non-negative, the proportional increase in revenue will be smaller than the proportional increase in costs.
The result is a decline in revenue-based productivity.
The logic above uses the following assumptions which are necessary for the proof of Proposition 1 below.
11Alternatively, one could also relax the integer constraint by letting nLL ≥ ε, where 1 > ε > 0. Following the discussion in the
main body, in this case, the average cost also has flat segments to the left of the MES up to the point in which it reaches nLL = ε.
At this point the average cost jumps to the level of the MES of the new optimal (and lower) number of layers. Depending
on the value of ε this will imply that the firm might decide to drop more than one layer. If ε is low enough, the average cost
curve will be a step function with no smoothing declining segments. The lower is ε, the easier it is for the firm to produce less
quantity with more layers, and in the limit, as ε → 0, firms converge to L = ∞. This case is counterfactual since we observe
that in most cases firms expand by adding one layer at the time (see Section 3).
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Assumption 1: Firms face fixed production costs and their chosen price is an increasing function of
their marginal cost.
Proposition 1 Given Assumption 1, a) Quantity-based productivity increases with a marginal increase in
λ when the firm adds layers; b) Revenue-based productivity decreases with a marginal increase in λ when
the firm adds layers.
Proof. Without loss of generality we fix factor prices and focus on the problem of one firm. Denote
the profits of a firm with demand draw λ producing with L layers by π (λ, L) = P (λ, L)Q (λ, L) −
C̄ (Q (λ, L) ;CL (·; 1) , 1, 1) − F, where we denote by P (λ, L) , and Q (λ, L) the price and the quantity
produced, respectively, given λ and L, and by F the fixed production costs. To ease notation we let
C̄ (Q (λ, L) ;CL) ≡ C̄ (Q (λ, L) ;CL (·; 1) , 1, 1) . Denote by λ̄ the level of demand at which the firm is indif-









We prove part a) of the proposition by contradiction. Consider first how quantity-based productivity
changes when a firm at λ̄ experiences demand λ̄ + ε, for ε > 0 infinitesimally small, and optimally decides
to add a layer.12 Toward a contradiction, suppose that quantity-based productivity is lower when the firm



































note that– as shown in Proposition 2 of CRH– since the minimum average cost for a given number of layers




























































is in the decreasing segment of the




≤ Q∗L+1. To see this, note that if the firm had chosen a quantity
level associated with the same average cost but on the increasing segment of the average cost curve, i.e.






































Since the marginal cost is increasing in quantity– as shown in Proposition 1 of CRH– if prices are













































































. This is a
contradiction. Hence, quantity-based productivity is strictly higher after adding layers at λ̄. So we have
proven part a), namely, that quantity-based productivity increases with a marginal increase in λ when the
firm adds layers.
We prove part b) of the proposition directly. Consider how revenue-based productivity changes when
























































































































Hence, we have proven part b), namely, that revenue-based productivity decreases with a marginal increase
in λ when the firm adds layers.
This effect in both types of productivity is illustrated in Figure 2 where we consider the effect of a shock
in λ that leads to a reorganization that adds one layer of management.
In sum, firms that add layers as a result of a marginal revenue shock increase their quantity discontinu-
11







ously. The new organization is more productive at the new scale, resulting in an increase in quantity-based
productivity, but the quantity expansion decreases price and revenue-based productivity. When firms face
negative shocks that make them drop layers we expect the opposite effects.
2.1.1 Some Portraits of Actual Reorganizations
The mechanism described above is naturally an abstraction of reality. To illustrate the way in which firms
actually reorganize in the data, we present a series of examples of firms that go through this process of
reorganization. We choose a variety of examples that includes firms in many industries, some that grow and
some that decline. For each example, we briefly describe the firm and the process of reorganization that it
went through. In addition we show how quantity-based productivity, revenue-based productivity and value
added per worker changed. The precise methodology and data used to measure quantity-based productivity
and revenue-based productivity is presented in detail in Section 4.
Example: A Firm that Adds Layers
We start with the example of a single-product firm producing aluminium cookware (anonymous given
confidentiality requirements). It increased its workforce over time and, in particular, by 27 percent between
1996 and 1998. In the same period exports increased by 170%, and went from representing 10% of the firms
sales in 1996 to 16% in 1998. Between 1997 and 1998 the firm reorganized and added a layer of management.
Our firm had a layer of workers and a layer of managers until 1997 and it added a new layer of management
in 1998 (so it went from 1 layer to 2 layers of management). As the theory suggests, its quantity-based
productivity grew by 16.9 percent when we compare the two years prior to the reorganization (1996 and
1997) to the two years after it (1998 and 1999). In contrast, value added per worker fell by 15.8 percent and
revenue-based productivity fell by 10 percent. Of course, we discuss the details of the estimation of both
12
Figure 3: An Example of a Firm that Adds Layers: Output, Price, and Revenue
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types of productivity extensively below. In Section 5 we show that this pattern of changes in productivity
is typical in our data when a firm increases the number of layers.
To explore this case further, Figure 3 shows the corresponding levels of output, prices and revenue for
the same firm and time period. The graph shows how, in fact, the increase in quantity-based productivity
is accompanied by an increase in quantity, a fairly large decrease in price, and a small increase in revenue.
These changes align exactly with our story in which the increase in quantity-based productivity generated
by the reorganization (that adds a layer of management) leads to an increase in quantity, a lower marginal
cost that leads to a decline in price, and a correspondingly muted increase in revenue and decline in revenue-
based productivity. Note that quantity in this firm grows not only at the time of the reorganization but
before and after it as well. This is consistent with a firm that is progressively moving toward the quantity
threshold at which it decides to reorganize. In these other years, demand and productivity shocks do not
trigger a reorganization and so we do not see the corresponding decline in price.
Example: A Shock to Textile and Apparel Firms
One issue with the previous example is that we do not know what caused the growth of this firm.
Fortunately, our sample covers the period in which China entered the WTO. So we now present two more
examples of firms producing in the “Textile and Apparel” industry. The reorganization of these firms was
arguably triggered by an exogenous event, namely, the reductions in quotas that resulted from China’s entry
into the WTO.13
13As a consequence of China joining the WTO a number of quotas that were imposed at the EU-level on Chinese imports– as
well as on imports from other non-WTO countries– were removed. Later on, in Section 5.4, we describe in greater detail how
we identify the shock and the implications that this shock had for the entire industry.
13
Table 1: Textile and Apparel Firm Reorganization, Nace 1772 Example
Firm with 3 Layers (2004)
Occupation Layer 0 Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
Managers 1 2
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 1
Clerks 2
Crafts Workers 15 4
Plant and Machine Operators 11
Elementary Occupations 1
Firm with 2 Layers (2005)
Managers
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 1 1
Clerks 1
Crafts Workers 4
Plant and Machine Operators 1 1
Elementary Occupations 1
Notes: O ccupations corresp ond to ISCO -88 1-d ig it m a jor groups.
The first firm we analyze is one that was hit hard by the (quota) shock and that we already referred to
in the introduction. The firm produces “Knitted and crocheted pullovers, cardigans, and similar articles”
(Nace 1772). Between 2002 and 2005, as a result of the quota reduction, it downsizes rapidly. Table 1
illustrates the hierarchy of the firm before and after the reorganization resulting from the trade shock.14
Labor force goes down from 37 to 10 employees. The quantity sold by the firm declines by 50 percent, value
added by 70 percent, and prices increase by 35 percent. Imported inputs double. We see that the firm
reorganizes and decreases the number of management layers from 3 to 2. Accordingly, and as expected,
the firm exhibits a reduction in quantity-based productivity of 51 percent, an increase in revenue based
productivity of 10.3 percent, and an increase in value-added per worker of 9.3 percent.
The reorganization of the firm takes a natural form. It fires the 3 managers it used to have (two in
“production and operations”and one in “sales and marketing”).15 In lower layers, the firm fires its “fibre
preparers”and “textile, leather pattern-makers and cutters”and now focuses on “sewers and embroiderers”
(reduces the total number but hires a new one). Similarly, it fires a variety of machine operators to focus
exclusively on “sewing-machine operators”. It also fires the one designer it used to employ. The result
is the elimination of the top layer, and reductions in employment in the bottom layers. Essentially, the
firm focuses on its top tasks and substitutes some of the others by producing less and importing more
14As we describe later, throughout the paper we use the variable qualif (see Table A.1 in Appendix A) to map occupations
to layers. However, for illustration purposes, while describing the reorganization of the firm we use the occupational variable
profissão (which is built following ISCO-88). This variable allows us to talk about more concrete and detailed occupations like
“Sewers and embroiderers”.
15Note that within each of the broad occupational categories that we present in the table there are several subcategories of
occupations that can map to different layers. In Appendix A we present in greater detail how we map occupations to layers
based on the tasks performed and skill requirements (qualif). For example, in 2004 the firm has two clerks, a statistical and
finance clerk and a stock clerk. The statistical and finance clerk has a qualif of 60 which corresponds to semi-skilled professionals
(with higher numbers representing lower skilled employees). Based on this qualif we assign it to layer 0. The stock clerk has
a qualif of 71 which corresponds to non-skilled professionals. Based on this qualif we assign it to layer 0 as well. The stock
clerk is “fired” in 2005. The remaining statistical and finance clerk changes qualif from 60 to 51 which corresponds to skilled
professional. Based on this qualif we assign it to layer 1. That is, this clerk got a promotion to a more demanding job.
14
Table 2: Textile and Apparel Firm Reorganization, Nace 1720 Example
Firm with 3 Layers (1999)
Occupation Layer 0 Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
Professionals 3
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 1 5 2
Clerks 14 10 2
Crafts Workers 17
Plant and Machine Operators 71 2 1
Elementary Occupations 17
Firm with 2 Layers (2000)
Professionals 2
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 1 5 2
Clerks 16 8 1
Crafts Workers 15
Plant and Machine Operators 49 3 1
Elementary Occupations 17
Notes: O ccupations corresp ond to ISCO -88 1-d ig it m a jor groups.
intermediate goods. Even though the firm is shrinking tremendously, the workforce that remains now earns
more, as our model predicts, with increases in median wages of 73 percent in layer 2, 33 percent in layer 1
and 3 percent in layer 0.
Our second example of a firm affected by the quota is a larger firm producing “Woven fabrics” (Nace
1720). This firm also goes through a substantial downsizing from 1999 to 2000. Quantity sold decreases
by 46 percent, value added by 30 percent, but prices rise by 13.8 percent. In the previous example we saw
that the firm shrank by focusing on its core activities. In contrast, this firm reduces its product scope.
It specializes in cotton fabrics (its core product) and drops the production of synthetic fabrics. This is
achieved with a reduction in the number of layers of management from 3 to 2, and a 46 percent smaller
labor force. Correspondingly, the firm’s quantity-based productivity decreases by 11 percent but its revenue
based productivity increases by 1.7 percent and value added per worker increases by 30 percent. Table 2
presents the organization of the firm before and after the reorganization.
The firm reduces the number of workers in the lowest layer by firing the workers that are not involved
in the production process of the core product. The firm fires its “Fibre-preparing-, spinning- and winding-
machine operators”, “Weaving- and knitting-machine operators”, “Bleaching-, dyeing- and cleaning-machine
operators”, and “Steam-engine and boiler operators”. In addition, the firm reduces the number of designers
(“Decorators and commercial designers”) from three, to one, to none within three years. Regarding the top
layers of the firm, we see clear changes in its leading structure. In 1999 the top layer of the hierarchy includes
3 top management business professionals, specialized in accounting. In 2000 the firm drops the top layer.
Layer 2, the new top layer, now focusses on dealing with less specialized tasks, including two middle man-
agement business professionals, and two administrative secretaries and related associate professionals– to
"implement and support the communication, documentation and internal managerial coordination activi-
ties of an organizational unit to assist the head of unit" (ISCO 3411). As a result of the restructuring, the
median wage in layer 0 goes up, by 7.5 percent, while in layers 1 and 2 they do not change much (reductions
of 1.4 percent in median wages but an increase of 1 percent in the mean wages of layer 0).
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Table 3: Footware Firm Reorganization, Nace 19301352 Example
Firm with 3 Layers (1998)
Occupation Layer 0 Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
Managers 1
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 1
Clerks 1 1
Crafts Workers 56 1 1
Elementary Occupations 9
Firm with 2 Layers (1999)
Managers
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 1
Clerks 1
Crafts Workers 47 2
Elementary Occupations 7
Notes: O ccupations corresp ond to ISCO -88 1-d ig it m a jor groups.
Example: Downsizing and Growing
These cases exemplified well the way in which the abstract mechanism highlighted by our theory works
in practice. However, one concern is that the way the restructuring took place could be particular to the
textile and apparel industry and not present in other industries. Therefore, we finish this section by briefly
presenting two other examples: one of a negative shock to a firm in the footwear industry and one of a
positive shock to a firm in the cork industry (where Portugal is a main producer).16 In these cases we have
not identified the exact source of the shock, but we observe similar, theory-consistent, behavior of firms as
they expand or contract.
Consider a firm producing “Women’s town footwear with leather uppers” (Nace 19301352) that goes
through a downsizing process from 1998 to 1999. The firm experienced a reduction in value added of 10
percent, reduced its labor force from 71 to 58 workers, and switched from 3 to 2 layers of management.
Accordingly, the firm’s quantity-based productivity decreases by 20 percent, quantity sold decreases by 24
percent, and prices rise by 39 percent. Our theory predicts that when a firm reduced the number of layers
we should observe an increase in revenue-based productivity conditional on past prices and other shocks (see
Proposition 1). In all the previous cases, this conditioning did not seem to matter much. Here it does, since
we observe revenue-based productivity decline by 12 percent even though value added per worker grows by
9 percent. Table 3 presents the organizational structure of the firm in 1998– the last year the firm has three
layers of management– and in 1999– when the firm has 2 layers of management. The firm reorganizes by
simplifying its management structure. The new organization has neither a manager nor a statistical and
finance clerk. The firm also reduces the number of shoe makers (identified in the table as crafts workers).
As a result of the restructuring, the median wage rises in all the pre-existing layers (by 3 percent in layer 2,
23 percent in layer 1, and 8 percent in layer 0).
Our final example studies a small firm producing “Manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting
materials”(Nace 2052) which goes through a growth spell between 2004 and 2005, experiencing a 3 percent
16Footwear and cork are two traditional Portuguese industries. For instance, footwear represents about 6 percent of Portuguese
exports in the 1993-2009 period, while Portugal is the biggest producer of cork in the world.
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Table 4: Cork Firm Reorganization, Nace 2052 Example
Firm with 1 Layer (2004)
Occupation Layer 0 Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
Managers
Clerks 1
Crafts Workers 8 1




Notes: O ccupations corresp ond to ISCO -88 1-d ig it m a jor groups.
increase in value added. The firm started with one layer of management and added another layer. Its
labor force goes from 9 to 12 workers. As expected, the firm’s quantity-based productivity increases by
13 percent, quantity sold increases by 28 percent, and prices decreases by 21 percent. Revenue-based
productivity declines, but only by -0.2%, while value added per worker decreases by 29 percent, indicating
again that the proper conditioning on past prices and shocks is relevant. Table 4 portraits the organizational
structure of the firm before and after the reorganization. The structure of the firm remains simple, with the
only addition of a layer of management that includes two production and operations department managers.
The small reinforcement of layer 0, where the number of craft workers– all of them "wood treaters"– rises
from 8 to 9, hides a more substantial churning, with two wood treater leaving the firm and three new ones
entering. As a result of the restructuring, the median wage decreases in all the pre-existing layers (by 1.4
percent in layer 1, and 7 percent in layer 0).
2.1.2 The Effect of Organization Across Industries: Some Simple Statistics
The arguments and examples presented so far indicate that when a firm receives a positive (negative) shock
that makes it reorganize by adding (dropping) layers, its revenue-based productivity decreases (increases).
Note, however, that this is the expected response only for firms that reorganize by changing the number of
management layers. Firms that experience similar shocks but do not change layers expand much less, which
implies that the price response is more muted, and so revenue-based productivity increases due to the direct
effect of the reduction in costs. We now show evidence of these patterns at the sectoral level.
Figure 4 Panel a shows the change in value-added per worker between 1996 and 2005 by industry when
we condition on firms that do not reorganize. Clearly, for firms that grow in terms of sales, value-added per
worker increases as well. In contrast, firms that experience a decrease in total sales see their value-added
per worker decline. The figure shows that all 19 industries exhibit this relationship. This is not surprising,
after all revenue productivity and sales are positively related in many theories of the firm.
Figure 4 Panel b presents again the change in value-added per worker but now for firms that increase
or decrease the number of layers. As predicted by our theory, but perhaps more surprising in light of the
previous literature, in this case we see that firms that increase layers tend to decrease value-added per
worker, and vice-versa for firms that drop layers. This is the case for all industries except “Communications
17






































































































































































a) Firms that do not change layers, by industry, 1996-2005







































































































































































b) Firms that change layers, by industry, 1996-2005
Increase layers Decrease layers
Equipment”, “Medical and Precision Instruments”and “Other Transportation Equipment”where some of
the effects are not significant. The switch in sign depending on whether a firm reorganizes or not is perhaps
remarkable, given that increases (decreases) in sales are highly correlated with increases (decreases) in layers.
The examples above are illustrative, we believe, of the different forms that reorganizations take in
practice. Sometimes firms focus or expand the set of production tasks performed, sometimes they restrict
or increase the set of products produced, and sometimes they simply add or take away managerial structure
to do less or more of the same. In all these cases, however, we find that the behavior of these firms exhibits
the patterns we expect, even though these patterns are quite complicated and multidimensional. Not only
do the firms reshuffl e their labor force as predicted, but the wages they pay, as well as the implications for
both types of productivity, are consistent with our mechanism. Of course, there are some exceptions, so the
rest of the paper is dedicated to present systematic evidence of the ubiquitousness of these patterns as firms
reorganize.
3 Data Description and Processing
Our data set is built from three data sources: a matched employer-employee panel data set, a firm-level
balance sheet data set, and a firm-product-level data set containing information on the production of manu-
factured goods. Our data covers the manufacturing sector of continental Portugal for the years 1995-2005.17
As explained below in detail, the matched employer-employee data virtually covers the universe of firms,
while both the balance sheet data set and the production data set only cover a sample of firms. We build
two nested samples. The largest of them sources information from the matched employer-employee data set
for the subset of firms for which we also have balance sheet data. It contains balance sheet information but
17 Information for the year 2001 for the matched employer-employee dataset was not collected. Hence, our sample excludes
the year 2001 (see Appendix A).
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no production data. We use it to provide basic statistics on firm organization. The smaller sample covers a
subset of firms for which we also have production data. This data is necessary to calculate quantity-based
productivity at the firm-product-year-level and so we use this sample in most of our analysis. Appendix A
and B include further descriptions of these datasets.
Employer-employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth, QP), a data set made available by
the Ministry of Employment of Portugal, drawing on a compulsory annual census of all firms in Portugal
that employ at least one worker.18 Currently, the data set collects data on about 350,000 firms and 3 million
employees. Reported data cover the firm itself, each of its plants, and each of its workers. Each firm and each
worker entering the database are assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number which we use to follow
firms and workers over time. Variables available in the data set include the firm’s location, industry, total
employment, and sales. The worker-level data cover information on all personnel working for the reporting
firms in a reference week in October of each year. They include information on occupation, earnings, and
hours worked (normal and overtime). The information on earnings includes the base wage (gross pay for
normal hours of work), seniority-indexed components of pay, other regularly paid components, overtime
work, and irregularly paid components. It does not include employers’contributions to social security.19
The second data set is Central de Balanços (henceforth, CB), a repository of yearly balance sheet data
for non financial firms in Portugal. Prior to 2005 the sample was biased towards large firms. However, the
value added and sales coverage rate was high. For instance, in 2003 firms in the CB data set accounted for
88.8 percent of the national accounts total of non-financial firms’sales. Information available in the data
set includes a firm sales, material assets, costs of materials, and third-party supplies and services.
The third data set is the Inquérito Anual à Produção Industrial (henceforth, PC), a data set made
available by Statistics Portugal (INE), containing information on sales and volume sold for each firm-
product pair for a sample of firms with at least 20 employees covering at least 90 percent of the value of
aggregate production. From PC we use information on the volume and value of a firm’s production. The
volume is recorded in units of measurement (number of items, kilograms, liters) that are product-specific
while the value is recorded in current euros. From the raw data it is possible to construct different measures
of the volume and value of a firm’s production. For the sake of this project we use the volume and value
corresponding to a firm’s sales of its products. This means that we exclude products produced internally and
to be used in other production processes within the firm as well as products produced for other firms, using
18Public administration and non-market services are excluded. Quadros de Pessoal has been used by, amongst others,
Blanchard and Portugal (2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets in terms of unemployment duration and
worker flows; by Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution of the firm size distribution; by Mion and Opromolla (2014)
to show that the export experience acquired by managers in previous firms leads their current firm towards higher export
performance, and commands a sizeable wage premium for the manager.
19The Ministry of Employment implements several checks to ensure that a firm that has already reported to the database is
not assigned a different identification number. Similarly, each worker also has a unique identifier, based on a worker’s social
security number. The administrative nature of the data and their public availability at the workplace– as required by the
law– imply a high degree of coverage and reliability. It is well known that employer-reported wage information is subject to
less measurement error than worker-reported data. The public availability requirement facilitates the work of the services of
the Ministry of Employment that monitor the compliance of firms with the law.
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inputs provided by these other firms. The advantage of using this definition is that it nicely corresponds
to the cost of materials coming from the balance sheet data. For example, the value of products produced
internally and to be used in other production processes within the firm is part of the cost of materials while
products produced for other firms, using inputs provided by these other firms, is neither part of the cost
of materials nor part of a firm’s sales from the PC data. We aggregate products at the 2-digits-unit of
measurement pairs and split multi-products firms into several single-product firms using products revenue
shares as weights (see Appendix A).20
3.1 Occupational Structure
To recover the occupational structure at the firm level we exploit information from the matched employer-
employee data set. Each worker, in each year, has to be assigned to a category following a (compulsory)
classification of workers defined by the Portuguese law.21 Classification is based on the tasks performed
and skill requirements, and each category can be considered as a level in a hierarchy defined in terms of
increasing responsibility and task complexity. Table A.1 in Appendix A contains more detail about the
exact construction of these categories.
On the basis of the hierarchical classification and taking into consideration the actual wage distribution,
we partition the available categories into management layers. We assign “Top executives (top management)”
to occupation 3; “Intermediary executives (middle management)”and “Supervisors, team leaders”to occu-
pation 2; “Higher-skilled professionals”and some “Skilled professionals”to occupation 1; and the remaining
employees, including “Skilled professionals”, “Semi-skilled professionals”, “Non-skilled professionals”, and
“Apprenticeship”to occupation 0.
We then translate the number of different occupations present in a firm into layers of management. A
firm reporting c occupational categories will be said to have L = c− 1 layers of management: hence, in our
data we will have firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in CMRH). In terms of layers within
a firm we do not keep track of the specific occupational categories but simply rank them. Hence a firm with
occupational categories 2 and 0 will have 1 layer of management, and its organization will consist of a layer
0 corresponding to some skilled and non-skilled professionals, and a layer 1 corresponding to intermediary
executives and supervisors.22
20 In our analysis, we also experimented with using the sample of single-product firms only. Results, available upon request,
are qualitatively identical and quantitatively very similar.
21Following CMRH we use occupational categories to identify layers of management. In the case of French firms, CMRH use
the PCS classification. In this study we use the Portuguese classification (Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd 1978) which is not
the ISCO.
22One potential concern with this methodology to measure the number of layers is that many firms might have layers with
occupations that are not adjacent in the rank. This does not seem to be a large problem. More than 75% of firms have adjacent
layers.
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3.2 Portuguese Production Hierarchies: Basic Facts
In this section we reproduce some of the main results in CMRH for France using our largest, but less
complete, dataset for Portugal. We focus here on the main findings and, for brevity, we relegate all the
tables and figures with the exact results to Appendix B.
Firms with different numbers of layers are different. If we group firms by their number of management
layers, firms with more layers are larger in terms of value added, hours, and that they pay on average higher
wages (see Table B-2). In fact, the distributions of value added, employment, and the hourly wage by layer
for firms with more layers are shifted to the right and exhibit higher variance (see Figures B-1 to B-3).
Thus, these results underscore our claim that the concept of layers we use is economically meaningful.
Our definition of layers of management is supposed to capture the hierarchical structure of the firm. So it
is important to verify that the implied hierarchies are pyramidal in the sense that lower layers employ more
hours and pay lower hourly wages. The implied hierarchical structure of firms is hierarchical in the majority
of cases (Table B-3). The implied ranking holds for 76% of the cases when comparing any individual pair of
layers. As for compensation, employees in lower layers command lower wages in the vast majority of cases
(Table B-4). For example, the proportion of firms that exhibits a hierarchical ranking for any given bilateral
comparison between layers is also greater than 75%. We conclude that, although with some exceptions, our
definition of layers does a good job in capturing the hierarchical structure of firms.
Our primary goal is to study the endogenous productivity responses of firm that reorganize. So it is
important to establish how often they do so.23 In a given year about half the total number of firms keep the
same number of layers, with the number increasing to 70% for firms with 4 layers (3 layers of management).
Most of the firms that do not reorganize just exit, with the percentage of exiting firms declining with the
number of layers. About 12% of firms in a layer reorganize by adding a layer, and about the same number
downscale and drop one. Overall, as in France, there seem to be many reorganizations in the data. Every
year around 20% of firms add and drop occupations, and therefore restructure their labor force (the number
is lower for firms with 3 layers of management since, given that the maximum number of management layers
is 3, they can only drop layers).
A reorganization is accompanied with many other firm-level changes. To see this, we divided firms
depending on whether they add, do not change, or drop layers, and present measured changes in the total
number of hours, number of hours normalized by the number of hours in the top layer, value added, and
average wages. First, we find that firms that either expand or contract substantially do so by reorganizing.
This is the case both in terms of hours and value added. Furthermore, changes in either hours or value added
seem to be symmetric, but with opposite sign, for firms that add or drop layers. After detrending, firms
that add (drop) layers tend to pay higher (lower) average wages. However, once we focus on average wages
in preexisting layers wages decline (increase), as the theory predicts. So, in firms that add layers, average
wages increase because the agents in the new layer earn more than the average but workers in preexisting
23Table B-5 presents a transition matrix across layers.
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layers earn less as their knowledge is now less useful (as found for France in CMRH).24
The results above can be further refined by looking at layer-level outcomes for firms that expand without
reorganizing and firms that expand as a result of a reorganization. The theory predicts that firms that expand
but keep the same number of layers will increase employment and wages in all layers. In contrast, firms
that expand and add layers, will increase employment in all layers but will decrease wages (and according
to the theory, knowledge) in all preexisting layers. That is, adding a layer allows the firm to economize
on the knowledge of all the preexisting layers. Hence, we expect the elasticity of normalized hours (hours
at each layer relative to the top layer) and wages, respectively, to value added for firms that do not add
layers to be positive. This prediction is confirmed for all elasticities except for one case where the estimate
is not significant (see Tables B-8 and B-9). We conclude that firms that grow without reorganizing increase
employment and wages in all layers.
Adding layers should lead to increases in employment but declines in wages in all preexisting layers.
These implications are verified for all transitions in all layers except for two non-significant results for firms
that start with zero layers of management (see Table B-10). Similar to the results in CMRH for France, our
estimates for Portugal show that firms that add layers in fact concentrate workers’knowledge, as proxied
by their wages, on the top layers. This is one of the consequences of a firm reorganization and supports
empirically the underlying mechanism that, we hypothesize, leads to an increase (decrease) in quantity-based
productivity as a result of a reorganization that adds (drops) layers.
4 Estimation
We now present our methodology, based on Forlani et al., (2015), to measure changes in revenue-based and
quantity-based productivity induced by firm reorganization. We first discuss our production and timing
assumptions, preferences and market structure. After that, we define the stochastic process for productivity
and demand. Finally, we discuss our estimation strategy and derive our estimating equations to estimate
the parameters of the production function and the effects of changes in layers on productivity.
4.1 Production
A firm’s technology is given by the production function in (1), which we have discussed before. A full
specification of the production process requires us to take a stand on the timing of firm’s decisions relative
to the realization of productivity and demand shocks. We assume that capital, Kit is chosen by the firm
prior to the realization of shocks in t.We also assume that at some time between period t− 1 and t the firm
has some knowledge about the realizations of the productivity and demand shocks (which we will denote
by νait and νλit, respectively) materializing in t. It is at this point that the firm chooses the number of
layers. Hence, we allow current period shocks to impact the choice of the number of layers Lit, but not
of the capital stock Kit. Of course, past capital and past numbers of layers, Kit−1 and Lit−1, as well as
24All these results are presented in Table B-7.
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lagged productivity and demand shocks, can affect the number of layers too. All other inputs are chosen
conditional on the realization of shocks, as well as the current period capital and number of layers.25
Denote by O∗it the constrained, by the number of management layers, labor input choice the firm makes
in t.26 Note that O∗it is not directly observable, but we can use that O
∗





where C (O∗it;wt), is the total expenditure on the labor input, i.e., the total wage bill of the firm (which is
observable), and AC (O∗it;wt) is the unit cost of the labor input which is not observable and depends on the
number of layers. Hence, the production function (1) in logs becomes,
qit = ãit + αO lnC (O
∗
it;wt) + αMmit + (γ − αM − αO)kit, (7)
where ãit = ln Ãit ≡ lnAit − αO lnAC (O∗it;wt) . Hence, measured quantity-based productivity ãit depends
on the number of layers Lit through the term O∗it.
27 Note that, conditional on the total wage bill, C (O∗it;wt),
the number of layers is not a traditional input in that it does not cost the firm anything. Hence, it is more
natural to treat it as a characteristic of the firm that determines the ability to transform inputs (including
the labor input through the total wage bill, as well as capital and materials) into output. In this sense, it
parallels a firm’s technological capabilities, so we treat them in a similar way.
4.2 Demand and Market Structure
We assume the presence of a representative consumer with generalized CES preferences (Spence, 1976). The






where Λit is a demand shifter, ηit the elasticity of demand, and Pit and Qit are the price and quantity of







(λit + qit), (8)
where lower case letters denote log values. Namely, λit = ln Λit, qit = lnQit, and rit = lnRit.






From the first-order-conditions of the cost minimization problem, we obtain that markups will equal the
25Our timing assumption on layer choice is guided by the observed frequency of changes in layers relative to changes in the
total real wage bill. Table B-5 shows that, in a given year, about half the total number of firms keep the number of layers
constant. Nevertheless, Table B-6 shows that these firms with constant layers do change their real wage bill by more than ±15%
in about 46% of the observations.
26The firm in t can choose the number of workers in each layer and the amount of knowledge in each layer.
27Note that −αO lnAC (O∗it;wt) = βLit is what is implied by the CRH model if we substitute the constraint nLL = 1 in the
organizational problem with nLL ≥ ε, for small enough ε > 0 as we discussed in Section 2. Hence, in that case, ãit = ait + βLit.
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ratio of the output elasticity of the optimized input to the share of that input expenditure in revenue (Hall,
1986). Defining sMit =
WMtMit
Rit
as the revenue expenditure share on materials, where WMt is the price of






Therefore, with estimates of the production function parameters, we can recover µit by simply combining
them with data on revenue and expenditures.
4.3 Assumptions on the Stochastic Processes for Productivity and Demand
We denote by ãit the log of quantity-based productivity, and assume that it follows a stochastic process. In
particular, we assume that
ãit =
{
αi + δt + φaãit−1 + νait if ∆Lit = 0
αi + δt + φaãit−1 + φL∆Lit + νait if ∆Lit 6= 0
, (10)
where ∆Lit = Lit−Lit−1 is the change in the number of management layers between t− 1 and t and where
νait is a mean zero productivity shock that is i.i.d. across firms and time. αi and δt represent, respectively,
firm-product and time fixed effects. We incorporate the effect of changes in the number of layers on measured
quantity-based productivity, implied by equation (7), parsimoniously through the term ∆Lit.
Regarding the demand process, we assume the following stochastic process for demand shifters
λit = δ
λ
t + φλλit−1 + νλit, (11)
where νλit is an idiosyncratic mean zero demand shock that is i.i.d. across firms and time and that can
potentially be correlated with the productivity shock νait.
We further assume that νait and νλit are uncorrelated with past values of productivity and demand and,
more generally, with all past variables. Precisely, we assume that
E [νaitãis] = E [νaitλis] = E [νλitãis] = E [νλitλis] = 0 ∀s < t.
Given our timing assumption for Lit, it follows that
E [νaitLit] 6= 0; E [νλitLit] 6= 0, (12)
and likewise that
E [νait∆Lit] 6= 0; E [νλit∆Lit] 6= 0. (13)
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Regarding capital, kit = lnKit, our timing assumptions imply that
E [νaitkit] = E [νλitkit] = 0. (14)
Note that the total cost of the labor input C (O∗it;wt) conditional on the number of layers and materials,
mit = lnMit, are endogenous to both current productivity and demand shocks, namely
E [νait lnC (O
∗
it;wt)] 6= 0; and E [νλit lnC (O∗it;wt)] 6= 0, (15)
E [νaitmit] 6= 0; and E [νλitmit] 6= 0.
Finally, given estimates of the production function we can compute revenue-based productivity āit simply
by adding the log price. That is,
āit = pit + ãit, (16)
= rit − αO lnC (O∗it;wt)− αMmit − (γ − αM − αO) kit.
4.4 Estimation Strategy
Our empirical strategy is to first estimate the parameters of the production function (αO, αM , γ) . With
these estimates, we obtain quantity and revenue-based productivities and use the process in equation (10)
to obtain the equations to estimate φa and φL. Finally, we incorporate firm-product fixed effects in the
estimation.
4.4.1 Production Function Estimation
To derive our estimating equation, we start by substituting the production function (7) into the revenue
equation (8).28 We then use the measure of markups (9) and substitute ãit−1 from (10) and λit−1 from (11) as
a function of observables. Here, we drop the firm-product fixed effects in order to minimize problems coming
from measurement errors, as suggested in the literature (Griliches and Mairesse, 1998)29. We incorporate
firm-product fixed effects again in the final step of the estimation. The resulting equation is
LHSit = δ
q
t + b1kit + b2LHSit−1 + b3kit−1 + b4
rit−1
sMit−1
+ b5qit−1 + b6∆Lit + uit, (17)
where
LHSit =
rit − sOit (lnC (O∗it;wt)− kit)− sMit (mit − kit)
sMit
,
28Please refer to Appendix C for a detailed derivation of all the expressions in this section.
29Following the argument of Griliches and Mairesse (1998), fixed effects are in general not included in the productivity process
and/or in the estimation of the production function, see Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Wooldridge (2009)
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In order to estimate the parameters of the production function using (17) we need to deal with two
issues. First, that the error term uit might be correlated with at least one of the regressors, and second,





∗ b̂4/b̂5, α̂M = −b̂4/b̂5, γ̂ = −b̂1 ∗ b̂4/b̂5.
To deal with the first issue we propose an instrument consistent with the model and timing introduced
above. Note that given (12), and (14), the error term uit is uncorrelated with all regressors except ∆Lit.
Hence, we can simply instrument ∆Lit with ∆Lit−1 and Lit−2.
Regarding the second issue, note that b5 > 0 implies that the autoregressive parameters of demand and
productivity are significantly different from each other (recall that b5 = 1αM (φa − φλ)). As we argue below,
this is a problem in practice. In the estimation we find that in many industries b̂5 is not significantly different
from zero.
To deal with this practical issue, we can proceed as follows. Substitute ãit−1 into ãit from (10) (after
again dropping the firm-product fixed effects in order to minimize problems coming from measurement
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and substitute to obtain the estimating equation,
qit − b̂2qit−1 = δt + b7Zit + b8∆Lit + νait. (18)
Note that in light of (13) and (15), the variables Zit and ∆Lit are endogenous so we require instruments.
Based on (12) and (14) we can use kit, ∆Lit−1 and Lit−2 as instruments. Using this second estimating









, γ̂ = b̂7.
Finally, after estimating the parameters of the production function, our estimate of the quantity-based
30Note that b8 is related to φL but cannot be used directly as an estimate of this parameter. The reason is that, as explained
above, we are not using fixed-effects to estimate the parameters of the production function. In contrast, φL, is defined in
equation (10) as the effect of layers on quantity-based productivity controling for firm-product and time fixed effects. This is
exactly what we do in Section 5 when we estimate φL using equation (19).
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productivity process is given by
ˆ̃ait = qit − α̂O (lnC (Oit;wt)− kit)− α̂M (mit − kit)− γ̂kit,
and our estimate of revenue-based productivity by
ˆ̄ait = rit − α̂O (lnC (Oit;wt)− kit)− α̂M (mit − kit)− γ̂kit.
With the measures of quantity and revenue-based productivity in hand, we can estimate the effect of
changes in layers on both types of productivity using equations (10) and (16), where we incorporate product
or firm-product fixed effects, as well as time fixed effects.31 In this step, the endogeneity of ∆Lit can be
addressed as in the previous steps, or using a specific exogenous shock. We pursuit both strategies below.
5 Results
Following our estimation strategy, we first use (17) to estimate the parameters of the production function.
Table D-1 in Appendix D presents the results. Note that b̂5 is significantly different from zero only in 2
out of 42 cases. Thus, as explained above, we are not able to identify αM and γ directly. We then proceed
to use the estimates of b1 and b2, together with specification (18), to estimate (αO, αM , γ) and obtain our
productivity processes. The estimates b̂1 and b̂2 are significantly different from zero in all cases (see Table
D-1 where we present Bootstrapped standard errors).
5.1 Estimating Equations
Armed with our structurally estimated productivity processes, we use (10) to derive our estimating equation
for quantity-based productivity:
ãit = αi + δt + φaãit−1 + φL∆Lit + νait. (19)
An observation, it, corresponds to a firm-product-sequence i at time t. A firm-product is a 2 digit Prodcom
code-firm combination. Furthermore, in the regressions below we use it sequences with either one change
or no change in layers to better pinpoint re-organization events. In case of a change in layers the change
might be either increasing or decreasing the number of layers. So we have 4 cases: increasing sequences;
decreasing sequences; constant sequences; all the above sequences.32
31This last step is similar to standard approaches aimed to find determinants of productivity (see De Loecker et al., 2016 and
Foster et al., 2008)
32A potential concern when estimating equation (19) is that, as dictated by the theory, we have used observations on layers
to estimate the productivity processes. This might generate a mechanical relationship between those process and changes in
layers that could affect our estimates of φL. In Appendix F, we present all the results of this section when we use estimated
productivity processes that abstract completely from layers and so do not use information on layers. The estimates of φL are
very similar.
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The underlying idea is to compare the productivity of firms that are, for example, increasing the number
of layers both among them as well as with firms that are not changing the number of layers. In the former
case, we obtain identification of the impact on productivity via comparing firms increasing the number
of layers before and after the change. In the latter case we also get identification from comparing the
productivity of firms changing layers with those that do not. To better isolate reorganization events and
ease comparability of an otherwise complex structure we break firms into sequences that correspond to at
most one change in the hierarchical structure.33
In order to derive the estimating equation for revenue-based productivity we use the fact that ãit =
āit − pit, and together with the process for productivity (10) we obtain that
āit = αi + δt + φaāit−1 + φL∆Lit + pit − φapit−1 + νait. (20)
Prices are functions of marginal costs which in turn are functions of quantities and hence productivities. As
a result, we use the first order conditions of the cost minimization problem to substitute for prices into (20)
to derive the following estimating equation
āit = ᾱi + δ̄t + φ̄aāit−1 + φ̄L∆Lit + φ̄RXit + ν āit, (21)
where Xit = [λit−1, pit−1, ln (µit) , kit]. Appendix C.2 includes a step by step derivation of this equation.
5.2 Reorganization and Quantity-based Productivity
5.2.1 OLS
We start by presenting the results using simply OLS, namely, ignoring the potential endogeneity of ∆Lit.
The specification we run is (19),
ãit = αs + δt + φaãit−1 + φL∆Lit + νait, (22)
where we substitute αi for an industry/product fixed effect, αs, to reduce the number of fixed effects.
Table 5 provides OLS estimation results. In all the results in this section we present standard errors
clustered at the firm level. All of the point estimates of φL are positive and significant and point to an
impact of reorganization on quantity-based productivity of about 3%. Adding (dropping) a layer increases
33We follow the exact same procedure as in Section 4. More specifically, we define a sequence of type L − L′ as the series
of years in which a firm has the same consecutively observed number of management layers L plus the adjacent series of years
in which a firm has the same consecutively observed number of management layers L′. For example, a firm that we observed
all years between 1996 and 2000 and that has one layer in 1996, 1997, and 2000 and two layers in 1998 and 1999 would have
two sequences: A 1-2 sequence (1996 to 1999) as well as a 2-1 sequence (1998 to 2000). Firms that never change layers in our
sample form a constant-layer sequence. We then separately analyze sequences characterized by an increasing, decreasing or
constant number of layers as well as all sequences together. As a result, each firm-product can “produce”multiple sequences:
for example, a firm-product with 1 layer for three years, then 2 layers for an additional three years, and then back to 1 layer
for three more years gives rise to two sequences, an increasing one (111222), and a decreasing one (222111).
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Table 5: Quantity-based TFP. OLS estimator with product fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
QTFP t-1 0.892a 0.875a 0.905a 0.895a
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008)
Change in layers 0.025b 0.032a 0.025a
(0.011) (0.012) (0.007)
Constant -0.161b 0.112a 0.309b 0.082b
(0.063) (0.035) (0.130) (0.033)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Adjusted R2 0.779 0.752 0.801 0.781
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
(decreases) quantity-based TFP by around 3%. We find that downward transitions seem to be characterized
by somewhat larger effects than upward transitions.
5.2.2 IV
There are two issues with specification (19). The first issue is that ∆Lit is endogenous. The second issue is
that due to the simultaneous presence of fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable, the usual strategy
of first differencing the estimating equation to remove panel effects may create problems in the presence of
predetermined variables, such as the lags of the dependent variable.
We deal with the first issue by instrumenting ∆Lit using demand, λit−1, and markups, µit−1, at time
t− 1, number of layers, revenue and quantity in t− 1, productivity at time t− 2, capital at time t, as well
as all of these variables lagged to the first available year. All of these variables meet the requirements of
good instruments under the timing assumptions of our model. In order to deal with the second issue, and
incorporate a full set of firm-product-sequence fixed effects exactly as in (19), we use the Dynamic Panel
Data system GMM estimator developed in Arellano and Bover (1995).
Table 6 reports the estimations of the structural quantity-based TFP equation. The results show a
positive relationship between changes in layers and quantity-based productivity even when controlling for
changes in quantity and allowing both variables to be endogenous. Coeffi cients are positive and significant.
Point estimates are larger than before where the effect of a firm adding a layer is 3% and dropping layers is
5%. We find a larger effect of around 6% when we pull all the observations in column 4, though.
5.3 Reorganization and Revenue-based Productivity
The purpose of this section is to study the relationship between organization and revenue-based productivity.
As we did before, we start by showing the OLS results first and then the IV.
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Table 6: Quantity-based TFP. Dynamic panel data estimator with firm-product-sequence fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
QTFP t-1 0.912a 0.880a 0.926a 0.910a
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.008)
Change in layers 0.037b 0.052b 0.062a
(0.017) (0.023) (0.016)
Constant -0.014 0.127 0.211a 0.116a
(0.016) (0.123) (0.042) (0.031)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Number of fixed effects 1,663 1,274 1,290 4,227
AR(2) Test Stat 0.468 0.117 2.443 1.980
P-value AR(2) 0.640 0.907 0.015 0.048
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
5.3.1 OLS
The specification we run is, following (21),
āit = ᾱs + δ̄t + φ̄aāit−1 + φ̄L∆Lit + φ̄RXit + ν āit, (23)
where Xit = [λit−1, pit−1, ln (µit) , kit] and, as we did before, we use an industry/product fixed effect, ᾱs, to
reduce the number of fixed effects.
Table 7 presents the results. All of the point estimates of φ̄L are negative and significant and point
to an impact of reorganization of about -3%. Adding (dropping) layers leads to an decrease (increase) in
revenue-based TFP of around 3%.34 Interestingly enough, and parallel to the quantity-based TFP analysis,
downward transitions seem to be characterized by somewhat larger effects than upward transitions. The
differences here are somewhat more pronounced, though.
5.3.2 IV
In order to estimate (21) we need to deal with the same two issues we dealt with in the case of quantity-
based productivity. Now, however, in addition to finding an instrument for ∆Lit, we have to instrument
for ln (µit) in Xit which is endogenous according to our assumptions. Our solution strategy is to use the
same set of instruments for ln (µit), namely, demand, λit−1, and markups, µit−1, at time t − 1, number of
layers, revenue and quantity in t − 1, productivity at time t − 2, capital at time t, as well as all of these
variables lagged to the first available year. As we did for quantity-based productivity here we use a full set
of firm-product-sequence fixed effects.
34We use the term TFP (total factor productivity) and the term ‘productivity’as synonymous throughout the text. For brevity,
sometimes we also refer to quantity-based productivity and revenue-based productivity as QTFP and RTFP, respectively.
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Table 7: Revenue-based TFP. OLS estimator with product fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
RTFP t-1 0.925a 0.940a 0.955a 0.943a
(0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.011))
Change in layers -0.023a -0.032a -0.027a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Demand t-1 -0.019a -0.018a -0.025a -0.020a
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Price t-1 0.010c 0.005 0.019a 0.012a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Log Markup 0.484a 0.434a 0.553a 0.486a
(0.043) (0.044) (0.059) (0.036)
Capital 0.004b 0.003 0.005b 0.004a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.237a 0.095c -0.704a 0.707a
(0.046) (0.051) (0.153) (0.057)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.844 0.882 0.860
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table 8 reports the results obtained using the same Dynamic Panel Data system GMM estimator used
above. The results portrait a picture very similar to the one emerging from the OLS results in Table 7.
While the effect of changing layers is now a bit smaller across the board, it is negative and significant
in all specifications. Table 8 indicates again that decreasing the number of layers has a larger impact on
productivity than adding layers. The overall causal effect of adding a layer is around -3%.
5.4 A Case Study: Textile and Apparel
As a final attempt to identify a causal effect of reorganization, we now use the textile sector as an example of
an industry that experienced an exogenous shock. The shocks we study are the changes in quotas applied to
the Textile and Apparel industry associated to China’s entry into the WTO. We use the data on reductions
in quotas across sub-industries and follow the methodology in Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016).
The underlying identifying assumption of this strategy is that unobserved demand/technology shocks are
uncorrelated with the strength of quotas to non-WTO countries (like China) in 2000. This is reasonable
since these quotas were built up from the 1950s, and their phased abolition negotiated in the late 1980s was
in preparation for the Uruguay Round.
To measure the degree of exposure to the quota removal we compute, for each 6-digit Prodcom product
category p, the proportion of the more detailed 6-digit HS products that were covered by a quota, weighting
each HS6 product by its share of EU15 imports over the period 1995-1997. Call this QuotaCoveragep.
Then, for each firm-product i, where by a firm-product we mean a 2 digit Prodcom code-firm combination
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Table 8: Revenue-based TFP. Dynamic panel data estimator results with firm-product-sequence fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
RTFP t-1 0.935a 0.956a 0.967a 0.953a
(0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009)
Change in layers -0.018b -0.035a -0.025a
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
Demand t-1 -0.006 -0.008a -0.008c -0.006a
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Price t-1 -0.007 -0.011c -0.001 -0.006c
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Log Markup 0.075 0.059 0.074 0.049
(0.070) (0.046) (0.081) (0.042)
Capital 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -0.027a 0.079 0.000 -0.014b
(0.009) (0.051) (0.000) (0.006)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Number of fixed effects 1,663 1,274 1,290 4,227
AR(2) Test Stat 0.043 1.352 1.548 1.805
P-value AR(2) 0.966 0.177 0.122 0.071
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
as in the rest of the analysis, we measure the level of exposure to the quota as a weighted average, where
weights are the initial shares of products p for a particular firm-product i, of QuotaCoveragep. We label
this variable QuotaCoveragei, and focus on the relevant period 2000-2005.
We estimate the specification
ãit = δt + φaãit−1 + φL∆Lit + νait, (24)
where δt is a time fixed effect. Note that there is no product fixed-effect since we are only conditioning
on firms in the Textile and Apparel industry. We estimate the regression using OLS and instrumental
variable (IV) estimators. The IV specification for quantity-based TFP uses the variable QuotaCoveragei as
an instrument. Note that since QuotaCoveragei is time-invariant, it precludes us from using firm-product-
sequence fixed effects. We are interested in events occurring in the relevant time frame 2000-2005 only,
so we lump together all of the available sequences. We obtain our set of instruments from a fourth-order
polynomial in QuotaCoveragei and the lagged number of layers. We present the first stage in Appendix E.
The revenue-based TFP specifications is given by
āit = δ̄t + φ̄aāit−1 + φ̄L∆Lit + φ̄RXit + ν āit, (25)
where, as before, Xit = [λit−1, pit−1, ln (µit) , kit], and δ̄t is a time fixed effect. Again, we drop the prod-
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uct fixed effect since we analyze only one industry. We instrument ∆Lit and ln (µit) with a fourth-order
polynomial in QuotaCoveragei and the lagged number of layers.
Table 9: Textile and Apparel: OLS and IV estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Revenue TFP, OLS Revenue TFP, IV Quantity TFPQ, OLS Quantity TFP, IV
RTFP t-1 0.834a 0.827a
(0.040) (0.042)
QTFP t-1 0.865a 0.864a
(0.030) (0.030)
Change in layers -0.014 -0.026 0.085a 0.147b
(0.014) (0.018) (0.028) (0.066)
Demand t-1 -0.011a -0.008a
(0.002) (0.003)
Price t-1 0.004 0.002
(0.008) (0.008)






Observations 554 554 554 554
Adjusted R2 0.666 0.660 0.729 0.725
Kleibergen-Paap stat. 32.50 42.03
Firm -product-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year dumm ies are included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05,
c p<0.1
Table 9 reports the results. We find that firms that reduce layers exhibit a reduction in quantity-based
productivity (significant at 1% for the OLS and IV) and an increase in revenue-based productivity (although
the results are not significant). The results on quantity-based productivity are consistent with the main
claim of our paper, significant, and quite large. When focusing on the firms that experienced the shock,
the IV results show that in this industry reducing a layer reduces quantity-based productivity by 14%.
Without instrumenting we find that these results are dampened, as we would expect in the presence of
reverse causality. The results are also larger than for the whole manufacturing sector. This might be the
result of the tighter identification of the shock, or of the particular characteristics of the textile sector. Firms
in the textile sector are larger and more labor intensive than firms in the rest of manufacturing.
In sum, throughout our investigation we did not find any significant evidence to falsify the hypothesis
proposed by the knowledge-based hierarchy model. All the significant evidence is line with its predictions.
Hence, we conclude that when firms receive an exogenous shock that makes them reorganize, both quantity-
based and revenue-based productivity are significantly affected.35
35Of course, there could always be some other unobserved concurrent response that causes the productivity changes and is
correlated with change in layers in the required way. Our claim of causality is qualified by this standard caveat to virtually all
instrumental variable empirical strategies.
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6 Additional Results
6.1 The Effect of Organization on Prices
As we have emphasized, the main difference between the impact of a reorganization on revenue-based and
quantity-based productivity is its effect on prices. Therefore, one obvious reaction is to try to look directly
at the effect of reorganizations on prices. While it is important to note that we do not actually observe
prices in our data —we have information on quantities sold and related revenues—we can still construct unit
values (revenue over quantity) in lieu of actual prices and study how they change as firms reorganize.
Using unit values as a measure of prices to measure relative changes in revenue and quantity-based
productivity could be problematic since any measurement error in quantity and/or revenue will add up into
this residual measure of prices. With this caveat in mind, we can measure the effect of a firm’s reorganization
on our measure of prices by estimating the non-structural price equation,
pit = b1,i + b2,t + bppit−1 + bL∆Lit + uit, (26)
where the dependent variable is the log price pit, computed as the difference between revenue-based TFP āit
and quantity-based TFP ãit. We also include firm-product-sequence fixed effects b1,i and time fixed effects
b2,t. We instrument ∆Lit as we did before.
Table 10: Prices. Dynamic panel data estimator results with firm-product-sequence fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
Price t-1 0.878a 0.851a 0.905a 0.882a
(0.012) (0.021) (0.017) (0.009)
Change in layers -0.059a -0.074a -0.074a
(0.015) (0.021) (0.015)
Constant 0.162b -0.060 -0.383b -0.001
(0.067) (0.067) (0.152) (0.005)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Number of fixed effects 1,663 1,274 1,290 4,227
AR(2) Test Stat 0.940 -0.395 1.833 1.354
P-value AR(2) 0.347 0.693 0.067 0.176
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table 10 reports estimations using the Arellano and Bover (1995) estimator. We find that the results
using prices are consistent with our main results, i.e. firms that increase (decrease) layers reduce (increase)
their prices.36
36Of course, we could use a similar reduced form approach to run identical regressions for all three variables of interest,
namely, quantity-based and revenue-based productivity as well as prices. This estimation leads to very similar results to the
ones in the main text. In this case, by construction, the effect of change in layers on revenue-based productivity is simply the
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6.1.1 Cost Pass-through Conditional on Reorganization
One way to think about the price responses implied by our results above is through the pass-through of a
change in cost into prices. A simple calculation taking the responses of revenue-based and quantity-based
productivity to a change in layers delivers a cost pass-through that is above one.37 This number might
seems high relative to other studies of cost pass-through that in general find values between 0.6 and 0.9.
However, note that this calculation measures the cost pass-through conditional on a reorganization. This
conditional pass-through has never been estimated before and so has no direct counterpart in the literature.
In order to compare the cost pass-through into prices in our data to the estimations in the literature, we
need to instead calculate an unconditional measure. In doing so, we follow two approaches.
First, we use Portuguese trade data to study the effect of exchange rate shocks on export behavior of
multi-product firms, following the recent approach of Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro, and Vichyanond (2013).
We find an import price elasticity to the real exchange rate of 0.85, which is very close to what that study
finds for Brazil. Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) find 0.83 with firm-level French data, while Campa and
Goldberg (2010) find 0.64 with country- and industry-level OECD data. Therefore, our findings for this
period in Portugal are clearly in line with the literature.
These results use export prices and not the Prodcom-based prices we use in our main analysis. So, as
an additional exercise, we compute the price response of changes in quantity-based productivity (obtained
using the procedure in our main exercise). We find almost identical elasticities with respect to cost changes
(we can do the estimation separately for multiproduct and single product firms and find price elasticities to
quantity-based productivity of 0.81 and 0.64 respectively, exactly in line with the literature).
Why do we obtain results that seem to suggest large pass-through? The key is that our results are not
measuring average responses of prices to changes in costs or demand. They are measuring changes in prices
(or revenue-based productivity) conditional on changes in layers. That is, a cost or demand shock can be
quite small, but it might trigger a reorganization since the firm was right at the threshold that determines
the decision to reorganize. The reorganization then changes the firm size substantially which results in a
large change in prices (as we argue in the main text). As a result, the associated pass-through will seem too
large because the original shock was small relative to the change in prices due to the reorganization (even
the augmented shock, once we take into account the endogenous effect on quantity-based productivity of
the reorganization, will seem small). Given that the literature has only calculated average pass-throughs
without conditioning on shocks that trigger a reorganization, our results are not directly comparable with
the literature and predictably somewhat larger. However, as we discussed above, once we calculate the
unconditional pass-through we obtain exactly the same numbers others have computed.
sum of the effect of a change in layers on quantity-based productivity plus the effects on prices.
37For instance; take the elasticity of a change in RTFP to a change in layers, -0.025 (fourth column from Table 8) and the
elasticity of a change in QTFP to a change in layers, 0.062 (fourth column from Table 6) and note that the implied response to
prices is -0.088 which is 1.4 times larger than the change in costs. The response is 1.2 times larger if we use the results in the
fourth column of Table 10.
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6.2 Aggregate Productivity Effects from Reorganization
The results in the previous Section indicate that reorganizations lead to large changes in quantity-based
productivity for a firm. If we want to gauge the importance of organization for aggregate productivity
dynamics, we need to understand how important is the effect of reorganizations for the average firm that
reorganizes. So, for the firms that reorganize we want to ask how important is the change in productivity
that resulted from the reorganization, compared to changes in productivity due to shocks, or the mean
reversion implied by the process in (10).
Consider a firm i that we observe from t− T to t. Iterating over equation (10) we obtain that
ãit − ãit−T =
∑T−1
v=0











Hence, the overall change in productivity for a firm, given by ãit − ãit−T , can be decomposed into three
components. The first term is the compounded set of fixed effects. The second term is a mean reversion
component that is negative when ãit−T is positive since φa < 1. Namely, productivity tends to revert to its
long term mean given the number of layers. The cumulative change in productivity due to a reorganization,




a∆Lit−v. The fourth term is just the
accumulated effect of past shocks. Note that, because of mean-reversion, the third and fourth component
explain more than 100% of the overall change in productivity. We now explore how large is the third term,
the change in productivity due to a reorganization, relative to the total.
We calculate these terms for firms that increase and decrease the number of layers between t − T and
t. Using our results for φL and φa from column 4 of Table 6 we calculate each of these terms for the whole
distribution of firms. Clearly, the actual change in productivity across firms is very heterogeneous. Some
firms that add layers experiment a large decline in productivity, while some experiment a very large increase.
Hence, we order firms by their overall change in productivity and in Table 11 present the distribution of
the overall changes in productivity and the change in productivity due to changes in layers.38 Columns two
and three present the results for firms that increase layers, while columns four and five present the results
for firms that drop layers.
The results are stark. On average, or for the median firm, the increase in productivity due to reorga-
nization explains more than the total increase in overall mean productivity. This is clearly not the case
for all firms, some of them receive large positive or negative productivity shocks that account for most of
the changes in productivity, but on average those shocks (and the associated reversion to the mean) con-
tribute to more than the aggregate mean variation. The result is that reorganization can account for an
increase in quantity-based productivity, when firms reorganize by adding layers, of about 6.3% while the
average increase in productivity for these firms was 6.6%. Similarly, when firms reduce the number of layers,
reorganization accounts for a 6.3% decrease in quantity-based productivity while the average decrease in
productivity for these firms was about 2%. Reorganization accounts for more than 100% of the overall
38The unit of observation is actually a firm-product and we allow t− T and T to vary across firm-product pairs.
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Table 11: Change in Quantity TFP due to Reorganization
Firms that increase layers Firms that reduce layers
Percentiles Overall change Due to reorganization Overall change Due to reorganization
10% -0.483 0.042 -0.523 -0.093
25% -0.179 0.051 -0.272 -0.062
50% 0.055 0.056 -0.034 -0.062
75% 0.318 0.062 0.200 -0.053
90% 0.673 0.100 0.517 -0.047
Mean 0.066 0.062 -0.019 -0.063
Observations 810 810 465 465
change in productivity of expanding and downsizing firms! These results underscore the importance of the
reorganization of firms as a source of aggregate productivity gains in the economy.
7 Conclusion
Large firm expansions involve lumpy reorganizations that affect firm productivity. Firms that reorganize
and add a layer increase hours of work by 25% and value added by slightly more than 3%, while firms that do
not reorganize decrease hours slightly and value added by only 0.1%. Reorganization therefore accompanies
firms’expansions. A reorganization that adds layers allows the firm to operate at a larger scale. We have
shown that such a reorganization leads to increases in quantity-based productivity of about 6%. Even
though the productive effi ciency of the firm is enhanced by adding layers, its revenue-based productivity
declines by around 3%. The new organizational structure lowers the marginal cost of the firm and it allows
it to increase its scale. This makes firms expand their quantity and move down their demand curves, thereby
lowering prices and revenue-based productivity.
We use a detailed data set of Portuguese firms to show that these facts are very robustly present in
the data. Our data set is somewhat special in that it not only includes employer-employee matched data,
necessary to built a firm’s hierarchy, but it also includes information on quantity produced. This allows
us to contrast the effect of reorganization, using fairly flexible methodologies, to calculate quantity and
revenue-based productivity. Furthermore, given that we have a relatively long panel, we show that the
results hold using a large number of fixed effects on top of time and industry dummies. We do not find
any case in which the evidence significantly falsifies the main hypothesis of the effect of a reorganization on
both types of firm productivity. In contrast, we present significant evidence of a causal effect of an increase
in layers on both revenue-based and quantity-based productivity.
Our findings underscore the role that organizational decisions play in determining firm productivity.
Our results, however, can be viewed more broadly as measuring the impact of lumpy firm level changes on
the endogenous component of firm productivity. Many changes that increase the capacity of the firm to
grow (like building a new plant or production line, or creating a new export link with a foreign partner) will
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probably result in similar effects on quantity and revenue-based productivity. In our view, the advantage
of looking at reorganizations using a firm’s management layers, as defined by occupational classifications, is
that firms change them often and in a very systematic way. Furthermore, this high frequency implies that
many of the observed fluctuations in both quantity-based and revenue-based productivity result from these
endogenous firm decisions and should not be treated as exogenous shocks to the firm.
We also provide new evidence on how firms change prices conditional on changes in layers. These
results relate to a large body of literature trying to underscore the magnitude of cost pass-through into
prices. While our conditional results are larger than the ones found in this literature, once we calculate the
unconditional pass-through we obtain exactly the same numbers others have computed in similar datasets.
Hence, conditioning on whether or not a firm has reorganized is important to understand the pricing decisions
of firms.
Recognizing that part of a firm’s productivity changes are endogenous is relevant because the ability
of firms to change their organization might depend on the economic environment in which they operate.
We have shown that changing the number of management layers is important for firms to realize large
productivity gains when they grow. Environments in which building larger hierarchies is hard or costly
due, for example, to the inability to monitor managers or to enforce detailed labor contracts prevent firms
from obtaining these productivity gains.39 This, among other factors, could explain why firms in developing
countries tend to grow less rapidly (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014).
39See Bloom et al. (2013) for some evidence on potential impediments in India.
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Appendix
A Additional Details about Data, Tables and Figures
We start with the matched employer-employee data set, keeping only firms in the manufacturing sector
located in mainland Portugal and dropping firms with non-positive sales. Information for the year 2001
for the matched employer-employee data set was only collected at the firm-level. Given that worker-level
variables are missing in 2001 we have to drop all firm-level observations for 2001. There are in total 353,311
firm-year observations. We then focus on the worker-level information and drop a minority of workers with
an invalid social security number and with multiple jobs in the same year. We further drop worker-year
pairs whenever (i) their monthly normal or overtime hours are non-positive or above 480; (ii) the sum
of weekly normal and overtime hours is below 25 and above 80; (iii) their age is below 16 and above 65
years; (iv) they are not full-time employees of the firm. Based on the resulting sample, we trim worker-
year pairs whose monthly wage is outside a range defined by the corresponding year bottom and top 0.5
percentiles. This leaves us with 321,719 firm-year and 5,174,324 worker-year observations. In the analysis,
we focus on manufacturing firms belonging to NACE rev.1 2-digits industries between 15 and 37, excluding
16 "Manufacture of tobacco products", 23 "Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel", 30 "Manufacture of offi ce machinery and computers", and 37 "Recycling", due to confidentiality
reasons.
We then turn to the balance sheet data set and recover information on firms’operating revenues, material
assets, costs of materials, and third-party supplies and services. We compute value-added as operating
revenues minus costs of materials and third-party supplies and services. We drop firm-year pairs with non-
positive value-added, material assets, cost of materials, and size. This reduces the size of the overall sample
to 61,872 firm-year observations and 2,849,363 worker-year observations.
Finally, we turn to the production data set and recover information on firm-product sales and volume for
each firm-product-year triple in the data set. In the production data set a product is identified by a 10-digits
code, plus an extra 2-digits that are used to define different variants of the variable.40 The first 8 digits
correspond to the European PRODCOM classification while the additional two have been added by INE to
further refine PRODCOM. The volume is recorded in units of measurement (number of items, kilograms,
liters) that are product-specific while the value is recorded in current euros. We drop observations where
the quantity produced, quantity sold, and sales are all zero. For each product-firm-year combination, we
are able to compute a unit value. We adjust the quantity sold, for each firm-year-product, by multiplying
it by the average (across firms) product-year unit value. We then construct a more aggregate partition of
products based on the first 2-digits as well as on the unit of measurement. More specifically, we assign
10-digits products sharing the same first 2 digits and unit of measurement to the same aggregate product.
We keep only manufacturing products, and aggregate quantity sold and sales at the firm-year-product level
following the new definition of a product. We restrict the analysis to products with at least 50 firm-year
observations. Finally, we merge the production data with the matched employer-employee and firm balance
sheet data.
40From the raw data it is possible to construct different measures of the volume and value of a firm’s’production. For the
sake of this project we use the volume and value corresponding to a firms’sales of its products. This means we exclude products
produced internally and to be used in other production processes within the firm as well as products produced for other firms,
using inputs provided by these other firms. The advantage of using this definition is that it nicely corresponds to the cost of
materials coming from the balance sheet data.
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Given that we restricted the set of products considered in the analysis, we compute the ratio between
total firm-year sales in the sample coming from the production data set and firm-year sales in the firm
balance sheet sample and drop firm-year pairs we extreme values of the ratio (below 25 percent and above
105 percent). We then adjust firm sales (from the balance sheet data), cost of materials, material assets,
wage bill, size, value-added, wage bill of layer zero, and number of employees in layer zero using the above
sales ratio. We then split the same set of variables into parts associated with each product, using the
product sales in the production data set. We trim firm-year-product triples that do not satisfy one or more
of the following constraints: the sum of cost of materials and wages, as a share of sales, below one; unit
value between the 1st and 99th percentiles; cost of materials as a share of sales between the 1st and 99th
percentiles; ratio of material assets to size between the 1st and 99th percentiles. The size of the sample is
now 19,031 firm-year observations and 1,593,294 worker-year observations.
Even after this significant– but necessary to accommodate the more stringent requirements of TFPQ–
reduction in the coverage of the data, our sample of firms still covers about 43 percent (49 percent when the
reference population is firms with at least 20 employees) of aggregate manufacturing sales, and 31 percent
(40 percent when the reference population is firms with at least 20 employees) of aggregate manufacturing
employment.
Table A.1: Classification of Workers According to Hierarchical Levels      
Level Tasks Skills 
1. Top executives (top management) Definition of the firm general policy or consulting 
on the organization of the firm; strategic planning; 
creation or adaptation of technical, scientific and 
administrative methods or processes 
Knowledge of management and coordination of firms 
fundamental activities; knowledge of management and 
coordination of the fundamental activities in the field to 
which the individual is assigned and that requires the 
study and research of high responsibility and technical 
level problems 
2. Intermediary executives (middle 
management) 
Organization and adaptation of the guidelines 
established by the superiors and directly linked 
with the executive work 
Technical and professional qualifications directed to 
executive, research, and management work 
3. Supervisors, team leaders Orientation of teams, as directed by the superiors, 
but requiring the knowledge of action processes 
Complete professional qualification with a specialization 
4. Higher-skilled professionals Tasks requiring a high technical value and defined 
in general terms by the superiors 
Complete professional qualification with a specialization 
adding to theoretical and applied knowledge 
5. Skilled professionals Complex or delicate tasks, usually not repetitive, 
and defined by the superiors 
Complete professional qualification implying theoretical 
and applied knowledge 
6. Semi-skilled professionals Well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical 
(no intellectual work) with low complexity, usually 
routine and sometimes repetitive 
Professional qualification in a limited field or practical and 
elementary professional knowledge 
7. Non-skilled professionals Simple tasks and totally determined Practical knowledge and easily acquired 
in a short time 
8. Apprentices, interns, trainees Apprenticeship   
Notes: Hierarchical levels defined according to Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd (Lima and Pereira, 2003). 
 
All monetary values are deflated to 2005 euros using the monthly (aggregated to annual) Consumer Price
Index (CPI - Base 2008) by Special Aggregates from Statistics Portugal. Monthly wages are converted to
annual by multiplying by 14.
In order to construct our firm level exchange rate shock, we follow Bertrand (2004), Park et al. (2010)
and Revenga (1992). Nominal exchange rates and consumer price indexes data come from the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset provided by the International Monetary fund and refer to the period
1995-2005. Using this data along with firm-level information on exports and imports across countries we
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construct two firm-time specific instruments; one based on firm-exports and one based on firm-imports.
We start by computing the log real exchange rate between Portugal (h) and any other country (k) at






where the nominal exchange rate (ehkt) is defined as units of home currency per unit of k currency at time
t while CPIht and CPIkt are the consumer price indexes of Portugal and country k respectively.
In the case of the export IV we look at the portfolio of destinations k served by firm i at time t − 1
and compute export shares for each destination k: EX_sikt−1. We then use such shares to aggregate





We construct a similar instrument using information on import origins shares: log(IM_RERit). Note
that the level of log(EX_RERit) and log(IM_RERit) does not mean much per se. What does have
a precise meaning is the time change within a firm which indicates whether there has been an overall
appreciation or a depreciation of the real exchange rate faced by a particular firm on the export and import
markets. Consequently, we use the change between t− 1 and t of log(EX_RERit) and log(IM_RERit) as
instruments in t. To be precise, we use the product of these change and the export or import intensity of the
firm (exports over turnover or imports over inputs expenditure) in t−1 as an instrument. The export-based
appreciation or depreciation is meant to capture shocks to a firm’s demand while import-based appreciation
or depreciation proxies for cost shocks.
Some concepts are recurring in the explanation of a majority of the tables and figures. We define them
here and consider them understood in main text:
• Product. In the production dataset a product is identified by a 10-digits code, plus an extra 2-
digits that are used to define different variants of the variable. In the analysis, in order to have
enough observations, we aggregate products at the “2-digits - same unit of measurement” level. We
keep only manufacturing products, and aggregate quantity sold and sales at the firm-year-product
level following the new definition of a product. We restrict the analysis to products with at least 50
firm-year observations.
• Layer number. In the matched employer-employee data set, each worker, in each year, has to be
assigned to a category following a (compulsory) classification of workers defined by the Portuguese law
(see Table A.1 and Mion and Opromolla, 2014). Classification is based on the tasks performed and
skill requirements, and each category can be considered as a level in a hierarchy defined in terms of
increasing responsibility and task complexity (qualif ). On the basis of the hierarchical classification
and taking into consideration the actual wage distribution, we partition the available categories into
occupations. We assign "Top executives (top management)" to occupation 3; "Intermediary executives
(middle management)" and "Supervisors, team leaders" to occupation 2; "Higher-skilled profession-
als" and some "Skilled professionals" to occupation 1; and the remaining employees, including "Skilled
professionals", "Semi-skilled professionals", "Non-skilled professionals", and "Apprenticeship" to oc-
cupation 0. The position of the workers in the hierarchy of the firm, starting from 0 (lowest layer,
present in all firms) to 3 (highest layer, only present in firms with 3 layers of management).
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• Number of layers of management. A firm reporting c occupational categories will be said to have
L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will have firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers
of management (as in CMRH). In terms of layers within a firm we do not keep track of the specific
occupational categories but simply rank them. Hence a firm with occupational categories 2 and 0 will
have 1 layer of management, and its organization will consist of a layer 0 corresponding to some skilled
and non-skilled professionals, and a layer 1 corresponding to intermediary executives and supervisors.
• Reorganization in year t. A firm reorganizes in year t when it changes the number of management
layers with respect to those observed in the most recent prior available year (year t− 1 in most cases).
• Year of the first observed reorganization for a firm. The earliest reorganization year observed
(for those firms first appearing in the data prior to 1997) or the first year in which a firm appears in
the data (for those firms first appearing in the data in 1997 or later).
• Firm industry. The industry of the firm is measured according to the NACE rev.1 2-digits disag-
gregation. This includes 19 divisions, from division 15 (Manufacture of food products and beverages)
to division 36 (Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.). We drop division 16 (Manufacture
of tobacco products), 23 (Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel), and 30
(Manufacture of offi ce machinery and computers) because they comprise very few observations.
• Wage bill. A worker annual wage is computed adding the monthly base and overtime wages plus
regular benefits and multiplying by 14. We apply a trimming of the top and bottom 0.5 per cent
within each year. A firm wage bill is the sum of the annual wages of all its workers that satisfy the
criteria listed above.
• Hours. These include both regular and overtime hours. We drop worker-year pairs whenever the
number of monthly regular or overtime hours is higher than 480, and whenever total hours per week
are lower than 25 or higher than 80.
• Material expenditures. This corresponds to the cost of the goods sold and materials consumed,
plus the cost of external supplies and services, as recorded in the firm’s balance sheet.
• Capital. This corresponds to the gross value of tangible assets as recorded in the firm’s balance sheet.
• Revenues and quantities. We use the volume and value from the production dataset corresponding
to a firm’s sales of its products. This means that we exclude products produced internally and to be
used in other production processes within the firm as well as products produced for other firms, using
inputs provided by these other firms.
• Value-added. Revenues minus material expenditures.
All monetary values are deflated to 2005 euros using the monthly (aggregated to annual) Consumer Price
Index (CPI - Base 2008) by Special Aggregates from Statistics Portugal. Monthly wages are converted to
annual by multiplying by 14, the number of payments per year in Portugal.
A.1 Tables and Figures Description
Table 1: This table describes the organization of a firm producing “Knitted and crocheted pullovers, cardi-
gans, and similar articles”(Nace1772) in 2004, when the firm had three layers of management, and in 2005,
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when the firm only has two layers of management. The table reports the number of workers by ISCO-88
1-digit major groups (on the rows) and layer number (on the columns).
Table 2: This table describes the organization of a firm producing “Woven fabrics” (Nace 1720) in
1999, when the firm had three layers of management, and in 2000, when the firm only has two layers of
management. The table reports the number of workers by ISCO-88 1-digit major groups (on the rows) and
layer number (on the columns).
Table 3: This table describes the organization of a firm producing “Women’s town footwear with leather
uppers” (Nace 19301352) in 1998, when the firm had three layers of management, and in 1999, when the
firm only has two layers of management. The table reports the number of workers by ISCO-88 1-digit major
groups (on the rows) and layer number (on the columns).
Table 4: This table describes the organization of a firm producing “Manufacture of articles of cork, straw
and plaiting materials”(Nace 2052) in 2004, when the firm only had one layer of management, and in 2005,
when the firm had two layers of management. The table reports the number of workers by ISCO-88 1-digit
major groups (on the rows) and layer number (on the columns).
Table 5: The data underlying Table 5 is composed of sequences of firm-product-years with either one or
zero changes in layers. For a given product, we define a firm sequence of type L0 as the series of years in
which a firm sells the corresponding product and has the same consecutively observed number of management
layers L plus the adjacent series of years in which a firm sells the product and has the same consecutively
observed number of management layers L0. For example, a firm that we observed selling the product all
years between 1996 and 2000 and that has zero layers in 1996, 1997, and 2000 and one layer in 1998 and
1999 would have two sequences: An (increasing) 0-1 sequence (1996 to 1999) as well as a (decreasing) 1-0
sequence (1998 to 2000). Firms that never change layers in our sample form a constant- layer sequence. We
group firm-product sequences into “Increasing”, “Decreasing”, and “Constant”sequence types.
For each type of sequence, Table 5 shows estimates of OLS regressions where the dependent variable
is our measure of quantity-based productivity, described in Section 4, in a given year. The key regressor
is the change in the number of management layers in the firm in year t. We control for quantity-based
productivity in the previous year, and include a set of year and industry dummies. Firm-level clustered
standard errors are in parentheses. The last column of Table 5 shows estimates of a regression that pools
all types of sequences.
Table 6: Table 6 shows estimates of the same type of regressions described for Tables 5 while allowing
for firm-product-sequence fixed effects. Instead of OLS we employ the system GMM estimator proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995) within the context of dynamic panel data with endogenous regressors. We
implement this with the xtabond2 command in Stata. We use for the levels equation demand and markups
at time t-1, number of layers, revenue and quantity in t-1, productivity in t-2, capital at time t as well
as all these variables lagged to the first available year. All of these variables meet the requirements of
good instruments under the assumptions of our model. We also use all suitable lags and differences of the
dependent variable as “GMM-style”instruments for the first-difference and levels equations.
Table 7: The data underlying Table 7, like for Table 5, is composed of sequences of firm-product-years
with either one or zero changes in layers. For each type of sequence, Table 7 shows estimates of OLS
regressions where the dependent variable is our measure of revenue-based productivity, described in Section
4, in a given year. The key regressor is the change in the number of management layers in the firm in year t.
We control for the previous year values of revenue-based productivity, demand shock, and price, as well as
for the current value of the markup and capital, and include a set of year and industry dummies. Firm-level
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clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The last column of Table 7 shows estimates of a regression
that pools all types of sequences.
Table 8: Table 8 shows estimates of the same type of regressions described for Tables 7 while allowing
for firm-product-sequence fixed effects. Instead of OLS we employ the system GMM estimator proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995) within the context of dynamic panel data with endogenous regressors. We
implement this with the xtabond2 command in Stata. We instrument changes in layers as well as markups
in this specification. We use for the levels equation demand and markups at time t-1, number of layers,
revenue and quantity in t-1, revenue productivity in t-2, capital at time t as well as all these variables
lagged to the first available year. All of these variables meet the requirements of good instruments under
the assumptions of our model. We also use all suitable lags and differences of the dependent variable as
“GMM-style”instruments for the first-difference and levels equations.
Table 9: The data underlying Table 9 is at the firm-year level and includes firms that belong to the Textile
and Apparel sector (Nace 17). Table 9 shows estimates of OLS and IV regressions where the dependent
variable is our measure of either revenue-based or quantity-based productivity, described in Section 4, in a
given year. We apply a trimming of 0.5 percent to the bottom and top of the distribution of TFPQ. The key
regressor is the change in the number of management layers in the firm in year t. In the regressions where
the dependent variable is revenue-based productivity, we control for the previous year values of revenue-
based productivity, demand shock, and price, as well as for the current value of the markup and capital, and
include a set of year and industry dummies. In the regressions where the dependent variable is quantity-
based productivity, we control for quantity-based productivity in the previous year, and include a set of year
and industry dummies. For the IV specifications, the main instrument is the firm-level degree of exposure
to the quota removal (QuotaCoverage), as described in Section 5. The full set of instruments includes a
fourth-order polynomial in QuotaCoverage and the lagged number of layers. Firm-product-level clustered
standard errors are in parentheses. Please refer to Appendix E for further details.
Table 10: Table 10 shows estimates of the same type of regressions described for Tables 6 except for
the variable of interest being price instead of quantity-based productivity. We implement this with the
xtabond2 command in Stata. We use for the levels equation demand and markups at time t-1, number of
layers, revenue and quantity in t-1, prices in t-2, capital at time t as well as all these variables lagged to the
first available year. All of these variables meet the requirements of good instruments under the assumptions
of our model. We also use all suitable lags and differences of the dependent variable as “GMM-style”
instruments for the first-difference and levels equations.
Table 11: Description presented in main text.
Table B-1: This table reports, for each year, the number of firms in Sample 1 and corresponding averages
across all firms for selected variables. Value added, hours, and wage are defined above. Value added is in
2005 euros. Wage is average hourly wage in 2005 euros. Hours are yearly. # of layers is the average number
of layers of management across firms in each year.
Table B-2: Table B-2 reports summary statistics on firm-level outcomes, grouping firm-year observations
according to the number of layers of management reported (# of layers). Firm-years is the number of firm-
years observations in the data with the given number of layers of management. Value added, hours, and
wage are defined above. Value added in 000s of 2005 euros. Wage is either average or median hourly wage
in 2005 euros. Both value added and wages are detrended. Hours are yearly.
Table B-3 and B-4: Table B-3 reports the fraction of firms that satisfy a hierarchy in hours, grouping
firms by their number of layers of management (# number of layers). Hours N lL is the number of hours
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reported in layer l in an L layers of management firm. For L = 1, 2, 3, and l = 0, ..., L − 1 we say that a
firm satisfies a hierarchy in hours between layers number l and l+ 1 in a given year if N lL ≥ N
l+1
L , i.e. if the
number of hours worked in layer l is at least as large as the number of hours worked in layer l+1; moreover,
we say that a firm satisfies a hierarchy at all layers if N lL ≥ N
l+1
L ∀l = 0, ..., L − 1, i.e. if the number of
hours worked in layer l is at least as large as the number of hours in layer l + 1, for all layers in the firm.
Following these definitions, the top panel reports, among all firms with L = 1, 2, 3 layers of management,
the fraction of those that satisfy a hierarchy in hours at all layers (first column), and the fraction of those
that satisfy a hierarchy in hours between layer l and l + 1, with l = 0, ..., L− 1 (second to fourth column).
Table B-4 is the same as Table B-3 for the case of wages, where wlL is the average hourly wage in layer
l in an L layers of management firm.
Table B-5: Table B-5 reports the distribution of the number of layers of management at time t + 1,
grouping firms according to the number of layers of management at time t. Among all firms with L layers
of management (L = 0, ..., 3) in any year from 1996 to 2004, the columns report the fraction of firms that
have layers 0, ..., 3 the following year (from 1997 to 2005), or are not present in the dataset, Exit. The table
also reports, in the bottom row, the distribution of the new firms by their initial number of layers. The
elements in the table sum to 100% by row.
Table B-6: Table B-6 reports the distribution of total wage bill changes between t and t + 1 for firms
that do not change layers between t and t+1. When computing the distribution we pool all years t between
1996 and 2004.
Table B-7: This table shows changes in firm-level outcomes between adjacent years for all firms (All),
and for the subsets of those that increase (Increase L), don’t change (No change in L) and decrease (Decrease
L) layers. It reports changes in log hours, log normalized hours, log value added, log average wage, and
log average wage in common layers for the whole sample. The change in average wage for common layers
in a firm that transitions from L to L′ layers is the change in the average wage computed using only the
min {L,L′} layers before and after the transition. To detrend a variable, we subtract from all the log changes
in a given year the average change during the year across all firms.
Table B-8: This table reports the results of regressions of log change in normalized hours by layer on
log change in value added for firms that do not change their number of layers of management L across two
adjacent periods. Specifically, we run a regression of log change in normalized hours at layer l (layer) in a
firm with L (# of layers in the firm) layers of management on a constant and log change in value added
across all the firms that stay at L layers of management across two adjacent years. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
Table B-9: This table reports the results of regressions of log change in hourly wage by layer on log
change in value added for firms that do not change their number of layers of management L across two
adjacent periods. Specifically, we run a regression of log change in average hourly wage at layer l (layer) in
a firm with L (# of layers in the firm) layers of management on a constant and log change in value added
across all the firms that stay at L layers of management across two adjacent years. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
Table B-10: This table shows estimates of the average log change in normalized hours and estimates
of the average log change in hourly wage at each layer l (Layer) among firms that transition from L (#
of layers before) to L′ layers (# of layers after), with L 6= L′: for a transition from L to L′, we can only
evaluate changes for layer number l = 0, ...,min {L,L′}. d lnnlLit is the average log change in the transition,
estimated as a regression of the log change in the number of normalized hours in layer l in two adjacent
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years on a constant. d lnwlLit is the average log change in the transition, estimated as a regression of the log
change in the average hourly wage in layer l in two adjacent years on a constant. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
Table 11: : This table reports the mean, and a number of percentiles, of the distribution of the overall
change in quantity TFP, as well as the component associated with a firm’s reorganization, for firms that
increase the number of layers and for firms that decrease the number of layers.
Table F-1, F-2, F-3, and F-4: These tables mirror tables 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively, with the only
difference being that the corresponding productivity measure used in the estimation, either quantity-based
TFP or revenue-based TFP, derives from a production function whose parameters were estimated without
taking into account changes in the number of layers, i.e. assuming that in equation (10), the estimated
productivity processes, abstracts completely from layers and so do not use information on layers.
Figure 3: This figure reports the evolution revenue, quantity sold, and price for a single-product firm
producing aluminium cookware that adds a layer of management between 1997 and 1998.
Figure 4 panel a and b: 5 panel a and b: This figure reports the log change in value-added per worker for
firms that increase/decrease sales (left hand-side) and increase/decrease the number of management layers
(right hand-side) by NACE 2-digits industries.
Figure B-1, B-2, and B-3: These figures report kernel density estimates of the distribution of log value
added (Figure B-1), log hours worked (Figure B-2) and log hourly wage (Figure B-3) by number of layers
in the firm. One density is estimated for each group of firms with the same number of layers.
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B Portuguese Production Hierarchies: Facts
In this section we reproduce some of the main results in CMRH for France using our largest, but less
complete, data for Portugal. Table B-1 presents some basic statistics for the largest, but less precise, sample
for the ten years spanned by our data. The data exhibits some clear trends over time. In particular, the
number of firms declines and firms tend to become larger. In all our regressions we control for time and
industry fixed effects. These results that follow underscore our claim that the concept of layers we use is
Table B-1: Firm-level data description by year
Mean
Year Firms Value Added Hours Wage # of layers
1996 8,061 1,278 102,766 4.37 1.25
1997 8,797 1,227 91,849 4.48 1.20
1998 7,884 1,397 96,463 4.81 1.28
1999 7,053 1,598 105,003 4.93 1.31
2000 4,875 2,326 139,351 5.13 1.62
2002 4,594 2,490 125,392 5.63 1.62
2003 4,539 2,363 124,271 5.65 1.70
2004 4,610 2,389 124,580 5.82 1.74
2005 3,962 2,637 129,868 6.01 1.76
Notes: Value added in 2005 euros. Wage is average hourly wage in 2005 euros.
meaningful. We show this by presenting evidence that shows, first, that firms with different numbers of
layers are systematically different in a variety of dimensions; second, that firms change layers in a systematic
and expected way; third, that the workforce within a layer responds as expected as firms add or subtract
layers.
Table B-2: Firm-level data description by number of layers
Mean Median
# of layers Firm-years Value added Hours Wage Wage
0 14,594 267.2 12,120.7 3.55 3.16
1 14,619 648.4 31,532.0 4.03 3.64
2 12,144 2,022.7 96,605.2 4.51 4.11
3 13,018 10,286.2 327,166.8 5.73 5.20
Notes: Value added in 000s of 2005 euros. Wage is either average or
median hourly wage in 2005 euros. Hours are yearly.
Table B-2 presents the number of firm-year observations by number of management layers as well as
average value added, hours, and wages. It also presents the median wage given that the wage distribution
can be sometimes very skewed. The evidence clearly shows that firms with more layers are larger in terms of
value added and hours. It also shows that firms with more layers pay on average higher wages. Figures B-1
to B-3 present the distributions of value added, employment and the hourly wage by layer. The distributions
are clearly ordered. In Figure B-2 the modes in the distribution of hours corresponds to the number of hours
of one full-time employee, two full-time employees, etc. The peaks presented in firms with zero number of
layers corresponds to the number of hours of discrete numbers of full time workers. This is also appreciated,
although to a lesser degree in firms with one management layer. For a similar depiction of how hours are
distributed for firms with different number of layers please see Figure 3 in Caliendo et al. (2015). The
figures show that firms with different numbers of layers are in fact very different.
Table B-3 shows that the implied hierarchical structure of firms is hierarchical in the majority of cases.
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Table B-4 shows that lower layers command lower wages in the vast majority of cases. Table B-5 presents
a transition matrix across layers. Table B-6 presents the distribution of total wage bill changes between t
and t+1 for firms that do not change layers. In Table B-7 we divide firms depending on whether they add,
do not change, or drop layers, and present measured changes in the total number of hours, number of hours
normalized by the number of hours in the top layer, value added, and average wages. For all these measures
we present changes after de-trending in order to control for the time trends in the data that we highlighted
before. Tables B-8 and B-9 present the elasticity of normalized hours (hours at each layer relative to the top
layer) and wages, respectively, to value added for firms that do not add layers. The first column indicates
the number of layers in the firm, and the second the particular layer for which the elasticity is calculated.
Table B-10 shows changes in normalized hours and wages when firms reorganize. The tables show the
total number of layers before and after the reorganization, as well as the layer for which the log-change is
computed.
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Table B-3: Percentage of firms that satisfy a hierarchy in hours
# of layers N lL ≥ N
l+1
L all l N
0
L ≥ N1L N1L ≥ N2L N2L ≥ N3L
1 91.64 91.64 — —
2 69.62 92.07 77.35 —
3 50.51 88.70 74.34 83.65
N lL = hours at layer l of a firm with L layers.
Table B-4: Percentage of firms that satisfy a hierarchy in wages
# of layers wlL ≤ w
l+1
L all l w
0
L ≤ w1L w1L ≤ w2L w2L ≤ w3L
1 75.87 75.87 — —
2 65.66 85.21 79.57 —
3 67.11 92.36 84.62 87.82
Table B-5: Distribution of layers at t+ 1 conditional on layers at t
# of layers at t+ 1
Exit 0 1 2 3 Total
0 31.19 54.29 12.54 1.69 0.29 100.00
1 25.75 10.26 51.12 11.35 1.51 100.00
# of layers at t 2 21.73 1.49 12.06 49.62 15.09 100.00
3 15.68 0.37 1.46 12.90 69.59 100.00
New 85.08 5.31 3.77 3.01 2.83 100.00
Table B-6: Distribution of total wage bill changes between t and t+ 1 for firms that do not change layers
Below ± 5% 24.98
In between ± 5-10% 16.68
In between ± 10-15% 12.36
Above ± 15% 45.98
Total 100.00
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Table B-7: Changes in firm-level outcomes
# of layers All Increase L No Change in L Decrease L
dln total hours -0.0068a 0.2419a -0.0080a -0.2992a
- detrended 0.2472a -0.0011 -0.2911a
dln normalized hours 0.0099b 1.0890a -0.0204a -1.1043a
- detrended 1.0761a -0.0299a -1.1128a
dlnVA 0.0173a 0.0509a 0.0155a -0.0126a
- detrended 0.0323a -0.0013 -0.0307a
dln avg. wage 0.0369a 0.0683a 0.0348a 0.0122a
- detrended 0.0303a -0.0018c -0.0253a
common layers 0.0356a 0.0068b 0.0348a 0.0750a
- detrended -0.0295a -0.0005 0.0387a
Notes: a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table B-8: Elasticity of n`L with respect to value added for firms that do not change L
# of layers Layer Elasticity # observations
1 0 0.1155a 6,351
2 0 0.1146a 4,998
2 1 -0.0147 4,998
3 0 0.1760a 7,079
3 1 0.0847a 7,079
3 2 0.0987a 7,079
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table B-9: Elasticity of w`L with respect to value added for firms that do not change L
# of layers Layer Elasticity # observations
0 0 0.0056 6,987
1 0 0.0216a 6,351
1 1 0.0283a 6,351
2 0 0.0150b 4,998
2 1 0.0229b 4,998
2 2 0.0303b 4,998
3 0 0.0225a 7,079
3 1 0.0201a 7,079
3 2 0.0298a 7,079
3 3 0.0199b 7,079
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table B-10: d lnn`Lit and d lnw
`
Lit for firms that transition




0 1 0 1.2777a 0.0062 1,614
0 2 0 1.6705a 0.0207 218
0 3 0 2.3055a -.1878a 37
1 0 0 -1.2304a 0.0557a 1,275
1 2 0 0.5178a 0.0038 1,410
1 2 1 0.4920a -0.0624a 1,410
1 3 0 0.9402a -0.0230a 188
1 3 1 0.8367a -0.1710a 188
2 0 0 -1.6449a 0.0692a 150
2 1 0 -0.5645a 0.0373a 1,215
2 1 1 -0.5060a 0.1192a 1,215
2 3 0 0.6806a -0.0015 1,520
2 3 1 0.7098a -0.0113b 1,520
2 3 2 0.6340a -0.0676a 1,520
3 0 0 -2.5187a 0.2673a 38
3 1 0 -0.9772a 0.0691a 149
3 1 1 -0.8636a 0.1672a 149
3 2 0 -0.7977a 0.0313a 1,312
3 2 1 -0.7532a 0.0467a 1,312
3 2 2 -0.6465a 0.1114a 1,312
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p<0.01,
b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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C Estimating Equations
C.1 Time evolution of quantity TFP
1st stage ESTIMATION Using (7) and (10) one gets
qit = αO (lnC (Oit;wt)− kit) + αM (mit − kit) + γkit + φaãit−1 + φL∆Lit + ν̃ait, (C-1)





































































Now divide both sides by sMit


















and use that sMitαOαM = sOit









































We now solve for ãit−1 and λit as functions of observables. For this, we need to find expressions for ãit−2
and λit−1. From (8) note that
λit−1 = µit−1rit−1 − qit−1, (C-3)










































and after substituting this expression in (10)
ãit−1 = φa ãit−2 + φL∆Lit−1 + ν̃ait−1




− φL∆Lit−1 − ν̃ait−1
+φL∆Lit−1 + ν̃ait−1,



























(ν̃λit + ν̃ait) ,















kit + φaLHSit−1 − γ
φa
αM
kit−1 + (φλ − φa)
rit−1
sMit−1









(νait + νλit) .
2nd stage ESTIMATION Using b̂1 and b̂2 we can implement a second stage to separately identify γ
where we use the productivity process and the production function (quantity equation). Start with output
qit = ãit + αO lnC (Oit;wt) + αMmit + (γ − αM − αO)kit.
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From (10) and (C − 1) we get
ãit = φaãit−1 + φL∆Lit + ν̃ait,










+ φL∆Lit + ν̃ait.
We then have that log output is given by
qit = αO (lnC (Oit;wt)− kit) + αM (mit − kit) + γkit
+φaαMLHSit−1 − φaγkit−1 − φa
αM
sMit−1
rit−1 + φaqit−1 + φL∆Lit + ν̃ait.
where we use µit−1 =
αM
sMit−1



























(lnC (Oit;wt)− kit) + γ
1
b̂1









rit−1 + b̂2qit−1 + φL∆Lit + ν̃ait
Note that the only parameters to estimate are γ and φL and in particular we only need γ to get quantity
productivity, markups, etc. The two parameters are estimated using a linear model
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C.2 Time evolution of revenue TFP
Recall that
āit = pit + ãit.
From (10) adding and subtracting from both sides pit we obtain
āit = φaāit−1 + φL∆Lit + pit − φapit−1 + ν̃ait
where we also define ν̃ait ≡ δt + νait. Now substitute for pit = mcit + ln (µit) .With our production function,






















Besides constants and variables that will be controlled for by time dummies this can be written in
log-linear form as follows
mcit = −
1
(αO + αM )
ãit −
γ − αM − αO
(αO + αM )
kit +
1− (αO + αM )
(αO + αM )
qit, (C-8)
using this we get
āit = φaāit−1 + φL∆Lit −
1
(αO + αM )
ãit −
γ − αM − αO
(αO + αM )
kit +
1− (αO + αM )
(αO + αM )
qit + ln (µit)− φapit−1 + ν̃ait
Note that qit = −ηitpit + (ηit − 1)λit, then
qit = −ηitmcit − ηit ln (µit) + (ηit − 1)λit,
then using again (C − 8)
qit =
ηit



















Substituting this expression into āit, we obtain
āit = φaāit−1 + φL∆Lit
− 1
(ηit + (1− ηit)(αO + αM ))
(φaãit−1 + φL∆Lit + ν̃ait)
−γ − αM − αO
(αO + αM )
kit +
1− (αO + αM )
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D Production Function Estimations by Industry
Table D-1: Production function estimations by industry
Final estimates 1st stage coeffs 2nd stage coeffs
Industry αM αO γ b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 γ 1st φL 1st αM 1st b7 b8
1 coeff 1.986 0.243 1.054 0.531 0.984 -0.405 -0.100 -0.089 -0.084 -0.598 0.095 -1.127 1.054 -0.060
st dev 0.657 0.080 0.307 0.181 0.170 0.239 0.183 0.194 0.219 4.875 3.249 10.561 0.307 0.065
t-ratio 3.024 3.024 3.438 2.935 5.787 -1.694 -0.546 -0.456 -0.386 -0.123 0.029 -0.107 3.438 -0.929
2 coeff 0.954 0.112 1.027 1.077 1.836 -0.627 -1.277 0.135 1.383 10.148 13.037 9.424 1.027 -0.724
st dev 0.742 0.087 0.522 0.493 0.310 0.571 0.334 0.353 0.954 58.118 103.558 52.661 0.522 0.423
t-ratio 1.285 1.285 1.967 2.184 5.920 -1.097 -3.824 0.384 1.450 0.175 0.126 0.179 1.967 -1.712
3 coeff 2.250 0.326 0.986 0.438 -1.161 1.424 1.907 -0.795 5.874 1.052 14.098 2.400 0.986 3.865
st dev 2.017 0.292 0.859 0.946 1.431 1.506 1.535 1.192 3.990 16.566 108.487 16.222 0.859 2.641
t-ratio 1.116 1.116 1.148 0.463 -0.811 0.946 1.243 -0.667 1.472 0.063 0.130 0.148 1.148 1.463
4 coeff 0.704 0.127 0.990 1.406 1.103 -0.986 -0.378 -0.181 0.301 -2.933 -0.627 -2.086 0.990 0.058
st dev 0.121 0.022 0.156 0.116 0.150 0.214 0.166 0.183 0.434 28.387 4.408 21.226 0.156 0.145
t-ratio 5.814 5.814 6.350 12.074 7.339 -4.600 -2.271 -0.992 0.693 -0.103 -0.142 -0.098 6.350 0.398
5 coeff 0.713 0.163 0.991 1.390 0.951 -1.029 -0.127 -0.165 -0.827 -1.069 0.636 -0.769 0.991 0.112
st dev 0.144 0.033 0.175 0.155 0.132 0.237 0.144 0.158 0.547 62.502 29.813 46.113 0.175 0.183
t-ratio 4.933 4.933 5.675 8.987 7.186 -4.333 -0.881 -1.040 -1.513 -0.017 0.021 -0.017 5.675 0.616
6 coeff 0.649 0.173 1.038 1.598 1.110 -1.329 -0.272 -0.119 0.049 -3.649 -0.113 -2.284 1.038 -0.053
st dev 0.189 0.050 0.240 0.241 0.197 0.321 0.217 0.218 0.649 33.287 7.531 20.052 0.240 0.113
t-ratio 3.445 3.445 4.321 6.621 5.638 -4.144 -1.257 -0.547 0.076 -0.110 -0.015 -0.114 4.321 -0.469
7 coeff 1.105 0.270 1.177 1.065 1.145 -0.736 -0.304 -0.103 1.856 -3.134 -5.460 -2.943 1.177 -0.128
st dev 0.762 0.186 0.540 0.813 0.295 0.826 0.342 0.219 1.416 22.134 56.903 18.599 0.540 0.465
t-ratio 1.451 1.451 2.181 1.309 3.873 -0.891 -0.889 -0.472 1.311 -0.142 -0.096 -0.158 2.181 -0.275
8 coeff 0.546 0.101 0.860 1.577 0.659 -0.788 0.059 -0.468 0.541 0.198 0.068 0.126 0.860 -0.017
st dev 0.135 0.025 0.179 0.199 0.300 0.379 0.303 0.327 0.817 14.357 10.458 11.574 0.179 0.472
t-ratio 4.054 4.054 4.799 7.932 2.198 -2.081 0.194 -1.430 0.662 0.014 0.007 0.011 4.799 -0.035
9 coeff 1.234 0.303 1.064 0.862 1.189 -0.492 -0.432 -0.261 -0.114 -1.428 0.189 -1.655 1.064 -0.031
st dev 0.490 0.120 0.288 0.211 0.134 0.260 0.147 0.156 0.224 125.055 33.314 141.990 0.288 0.054
t-ratio 2.515 2.515 3.698 4.080 8.857 -1.892 -2.946 -1.669 -0.510 -0.011 0.006 -0.012 3.698 -0.570
10 coeff 0.252 0.060 0.719 2.849 0.967 -1.740 -0.311 -0.407 1.095 -2.175 -0.836 -0.763 0.719 1.870
st dev 0.146 0.035 0.280 0.905 0.847 0.854 1.069 0.694 3.838 33.919 37.182 10.094 0.280 1.627
t-ratio 1.723 1.723 2.565 3.150 1.141 -2.037 -0.291 -0.587 0.285 -0.064 -0.022 -0.076 2.565 1.150
11 coeff 0.996 0.116 0.887 0.890 0.546 0.150 -0.330 -0.067 0.060 -4.358 -0.295 -4.897 0.887 -0.023
st dev 0.389 0.045 0.209 0.289 0.512 0.557 0.621 0.456 0.449 39.547 43.679 41.260 0.209 0.182
t-ratio 2.559 2.559 4.252 3.075 1.067 0.269 -0.531 -0.148 0.134 -0.110 -0.007 -0.119 4.252 -0.123
12 coeff 0.215 0.024 0.711 3.303 0.956 -2.568 -0.596 -0.053 -0.981 -37.036 11.000 -11.213 0.711 0.052
st dev 0.098 0.011 0.236 1.051 0.605 1.145 0.642 0.639 0.392 20.127 6.953 6.297 0.236 0.063
t-ratio 2.198 2.198 3.015 3.144 1.581 -2.243 -0.929 -0.083 -2.504 -1.840 1.582 -1.781 3.015 0.817
13 coeff 0.442 0.117 0.789 1.783 1.113 -1.460 -0.278 -0.052 1.302 -9.488 -6.927 -5.320 0.789 0.089
st dev 0.347 0.092 0.444 0.858 0.267 0.960 0.298 0.433 0.845 13.540 11.084 7.419 0.444 0.138
t-ratio 1.275 1.275 1.778 2.079 4.165 -1.521 -0.933 -0.121 1.541 -0.701 -0.625 -0.717 1.778 0.643
14 coeff 0.476 0.100 0.877 1.842 1.163 -1.360 -0.437 -0.337 -0.174 -2.386 0.226 -1.295 0.877 -0.008
st dev 0.301 0.063 0.403 0.458 0.184 0.514 0.199 0.208 0.283 12.227 1.559 6.706 0.403 0.039
t-ratio 1.582 1.582 2.175 4.022 6.316 -2.644 -2.191 -1.624 -0.616 -0.195 0.145 -0.193 2.175 -0.219
15 coeff 0.760 0.113 0.903 1.188 1.094 -0.869 -0.349 -0.070 0.480 -5.905 -2.384 -4.969 0.903 0.044
st dev 0.242 0.036 0.237 0.206 0.127 0.237 0.143 0.141 0.275 16.740 8.888 13.727 0.237 0.071
t-ratio 3.144 3.144 3.814 5.779 8.615 -3.660 -2.452 -0.498 1.743 -0.353 -0.268 -0.362 3.814 0.610
16 coeff 0.621 0.086 0.884 1.423 0.913 -0.781 -0.238 -0.376 0.306 -0.902 -0.194 -0.634 0.884 0.072
st dev 0.211 0.029 0.273 0.191 0.307 0.361 0.333 0.330 0.284 24.059 8.461 17.499 0.273 0.109
t-ratio 2.945 2.945 3.238 7.437 2.977 -2.163 -0.716 -1.139 1.080 -0.037 -0.023 -0.036 3.238 0.660
17 coeff 0.547 0.100 0.991 1.813 1.518 -1.594 -0.723 -0.095 1.589 -13.763 -12.064 -7.594 0.991 0.001
st dev 0.385 0.070 0.614 0.379 0.383 0.515 0.427 0.315 0.732 39.834 42.998 22.489 0.614 0.296
t-ratio 1.419 1.419 1.613 4.779 3.961 -3.095 -1.692 -0.303 2.169 -0.346 -0.281 -0.338 1.613 0.004
18 coeff 0.464 0.109 0.911 1.965 0.959 -1.832 -0.113 -0.007 0.381 -31.362 -6.077 -15.963 0.911 0.058
st dev 0.148 0.035 0.254 0.321 0.264 0.416 0.289 0.208 0.510 24.258 11.958 13.634 0.254 0.131
t-ratio 3.138 3.138 3.581 6.112 3.636 -4.403 -0.389 -0.034 0.746 -1.293 -0.508 -1.171 3.581 0.440
19 coeff 0.532 0.106 0.976 1.837 1.370 -1.907 -0.561 0.134 0.315 7.703 1.322 4.193 0.976 -0.005
st dev 0.342 0.068 0.420 0.325 0.257 0.440 0.278 0.289 0.432 123.895 13.284 68.576 0.420 0.086
t-ratio 1.555 1.555 2.327 5.645 5.327 -4.331 -2.017 0.463 0.730 0.062 0.099 0.061 2.327 -0.055
20 coeff 0.382 0.136 0.755 1.979 0.922 -1.244 0.011 -0.663 -0.737 0.034 -0.013 0.017 0.755 0.055
st dev 0.165 0.059 0.262 0.785 0.313 0.747 0.350 0.311 0.852 1.955 0.992 1.163 0.262 0.124
t-ratio 2.320 2.320 2.882 2.522 2.947 -1.667 0.033 -2.128 -0.864 0.017 -0.013 0.015 2.882 0.441
21 coeff 0.732 0.136 0.842 1.149 0.923 -0.866 -0.134 0.023 -1.170 6.672 -6.792 5.805 0.842 -0.114
st dev 0.611 0.113 0.575 0.634 0.257 0.658 0.274 0.299 0.511 9.204 9.640 8.129 0.575 0.087
t-ratio 1.198 1.198 1.463 1.812 3.594 -1.316 -0.488 0.077 -2.290 0.725 -0.705 0.714 1.463 -1.303
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors.
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Continuation of Table D-1
Final estimates 1st stage coeffs 2nd stage coeffs
Industry αM αO γ b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 γ 1st φL 1st αM 1st b7 b8
22 coeff 0.697 0.089 0.982 1.409 0.831 -1.053 0.023 -0.199 -0.640 0.162 -0.073 0.115 0.982 -0.058
st dev 0.190 0.024 0.235 0.180 0.176 0.267 0.185 0.195 0.387 1547.564 842.053 1130.622 0.235 0.077
t-ratio 3.663 3.663 4.178 7.822 4.714 -3.940 0.123 -1.020 -1.652 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.178 -0.744
23 coeff 0.376 0.044 0.883 2.347 0.831 -2.186 0.086 -0.097 0.652 2.074 0.576 0.883 0.883 -0.431
st dev 0.218 0.025 0.375 0.553 0.225 0.571 0.249 0.125 0.473 21.844 4.939 10.910 0.375 0.176
t-ratio 1.726 1.726 2.356 4.244 3.702 -3.828 0.345 -0.780 1.378 0.095 0.117 0.081 2.356 -2.455
24 coeff 0.799 0.170 1.009 1.263 0.821 -0.962 0.083 -0.251 -0.245 0.418 -0.081 0.331 1.009 0.070
st dev 0.326 0.069 0.325 0.258 0.155 0.288 0.169 0.165 0.415 12.158 2.496 9.002 0.325 0.114
t-ratio 2.450 2.450 3.104 4.901 5.299 -3.344 0.491 -1.518 -0.590 0.034 -0.032 0.037 3.104 0.608
25 coeff 0.606 0.142 0.727 1.199 1.126 -1.107 -0.200 -0.065 1.537 -3.668 -4.702 -3.059 0.727 0.031
st dev 0.596 0.140 0.304 0.490 0.334 0.461 0.353 0.174 0.922 56.557 132.674 60.124 0.304 0.294
t-ratio 1.017 1.017 2.387 2.447 3.372 -2.401 -0.566 -0.377 1.668 -0.065 -0.035 -0.051 2.387 0.107
26 coeff 0.758 0.215 0.965 1.273 1.135 -1.003 -0.314 0.028 -0.279 14.534 -3.180 11.419 0.965 0.081
st dev 0.397 0.112 0.358 0.386 0.147 0.381 0.161 0.160 0.336 21.490 5.399 16.715 0.358 0.046
t-ratio 1.908 1.908 2.691 3.293 7.723 -2.633 -1.956 0.172 -0.830 0.676 -0.589 0.683 2.691 1.742
27 coeff 0.506 0.142 0.979 1.937 1.438 -1.237 -0.749 -0.065 -0.164 -22.195 1.883 -11.461 0.979 -0.021
st dev 0.276 0.078 0.476 0.448 0.573 0.793 0.634 0.760 0.839 77.641 28.354 46.658 0.476 0.403
t-ratio 1.835 1.835 2.056 4.327 2.510 -1.560 -1.182 -0.086 -0.196 -0.286 0.066 -0.246 2.056 -0.052
28 coeff 1.025 0.228 1.105 1.078 1.382 -1.043 -0.605 0.107 0.688 6.118 3.903 5.675 1.105 0.206
st dev 1.393 0.310 0.981 0.944 0.409 1.004 0.438 0.409 0.532 73.680 33.076 36.875 0.981 0.188
t-ratio 0.736 0.736 1.127 1.143 3.383 -1.039 -1.381 0.260 1.293 0.083 0.118 0.154 1.127 1.096
29 coeff 0.634 0.218 1.034 1.630 0.880 -0.461 -0.151 -0.695 0.621 -0.355 -0.135 -0.218 1.034 0.111
st dev 0.384 0.132 0.466 0.738 0.410 0.965 0.449 0.684 0.859 8.694 5.110 5.253 0.466 0.089
t-ratio 1.650 1.650 2.221 2.210 2.146 -0.478 -0.337 -1.015 0.723 -0.041 -0.026 -0.041 2.221 1.257
30 coeff 0.708 0.186 0.982 1.386 1.427 -1.527 -0.543 0.078 0.295 9.705 2.066 7.003 0.982 -0.230
st dev 0.441 0.116 0.482 0.451 0.255 0.552 0.281 0.313 0.810 28.269 47.277 23.158 0.482 0.398
t-ratio 1.606 1.606 2.035 3.072 5.606 -2.766 -1.932 0.247 0.364 0.343 0.044 0.302 2.035 -0.579
31 coeff 0.725 0.226 1.024 1.412 1.272 -1.225 -0.477 -0.073 -0.043 -9.209 0.278 -6.522 1.024 -0.027
st dev 0.299 0.093 0.323 0.281 0.164 0.327 0.181 0.170 0.484 114.616 21.381 74.139 0.323 0.167
t-ratio 2.423 2.423 3.167 5.026 7.779 -3.742 -2.628 -0.431 -0.088 -0.080 0.013 -0.088 3.167 -0.163
32 coeff 0.607 0.163 0.990 1.629 1.199 -1.424 -0.455 0.040 0.547 18.627 6.251 11.434 0.990 -0.071
st dev 0.365 0.098 0.328 0.421 0.175 0.455 0.192 0.177 0.496 60.765 13.372 26.222 0.328 0.102
t-ratio 1.666 1.666 3.019 3.867 6.861 -3.128 -2.372 0.225 1.103 0.307 0.467 0.436 3.019 -0.695
33 coeff 0.464 0.146 1.041 2.243 1.116 -2.019 -0.278 -0.098 -1.639 -6.330 4.625 -2.822 1.041 0.372
st dev 0.217 0.068 0.429 0.709 0.367 0.788 0.406 0.373 1.185 16.062 15.211 6.010 0.429 0.257
t-ratio 2.137 2.137 2.429 3.164 3.044 -2.562 -0.683 -0.264 -1.383 -0.394 0.304 -0.470 2.429 1.447
34 coeff 0.434 0.145 0.974 2.242 2.127 -2.200 -1.533 0.161 1.940 21.342 18.462 9.518 0.974 -0.193
st dev 0.139 0.046 0.187 0.472 0.194 0.496 0.218 0.148 0.716 333.452 318.260 141.900 0.187 0.257
t-ratio 3.114 3.114 5.214 4.746 10.946 -4.436 -7.022 1.085 2.708 0.064 0.058 0.067 5.214 -0.749
35 coeff 0.561 0.081 0.876 1.561 1.052 -1.698 -0.139 0.163 -1.239 1.332 -1.057 0.853 0.876 -0.035
st dev 0.200 0.029 0.280 0.284 0.295 0.413 0.283 0.242 0.690 130.386 12.485 83.059 0.280 0.268
t-ratio 2.809 2.809 3.130 5.500 3.564 -4.112 -0.490 0.671 -1.797 0.010 -0.085 0.010 3.130 -0.130
36 coeff 0.841 0.185 1.126 1.340 1.136 -1.160 -0.310 -0.122 -0.503 -3.414 1.282 -2.548 1.126 0.115
st dev 0.718 0.158 0.543 0.580 0.174 0.592 0.183 0.128 0.617 57.560 72.913 30.864 0.543 0.202
t-ratio 1.171 1.171 2.074 2.308 6.530 -1.958 -1.692 -0.947 -0.815 -0.059 0.018 -0.083 2.074 0.569
37 coeff 0.779 0.118 1.393 1.788 0.914 -0.954 -0.124 -0.758 -1.527 -0.293 0.251 -0.164 1.393 0.066
st dev 0.462 0.070 0.628 0.943 0.450 1.174 0.502 0.594 1.520 11.416 7.777 4.683 0.628 0.526
t-ratio 1.688 1.688 2.218 1.896 2.033 -0.812 -0.248 -1.276 -1.005 -0.026 0.032 -0.035 2.218 0.125
38 coeff 0.348 0.068 0.790 2.266 2.801 -2.973 -2.416 1.550 3.674 3.534 5.730 1.559 0.790 -0.563
st dev 0.198 0.039 0.434 1.517 0.576 1.532 0.705 0.649 1.536 3.510 4.335 0.977 0.434 3.257
t-ratio 1.756 1.756 1.821 1.494 4.864 -1.941 -3.426 2.388 2.392 1.007 1.322 1.595 1.821 -0.173
39 coeff 0.994 0.185 1.101 1.108 1.134 -0.932 -0.435 -0.038 -0.124 -12.538 1.402 -11.317 1.101 -0.364
st dev 0.828 0.154 0.551 0.597 0.202 0.617 0.239 0.184 0.976 47.010 17.281 46.608 0.551 0.351
t-ratio 1.200 1.200 1.999 1.857 5.621 -1.511 -1.817 -0.208 -0.127 -0.267 0.081 -0.243 1.999 -1.036
40 coeff 0.598 0.148 0.860 1.438 0.680 -0.620 0.032 -0.850 0.037 0.054 0.001 0.038 0.860 -0.164
st dev 0.286 0.071 0.323 0.528 0.517 0.745 0.540 0.681 2.150 4.724 5.305 3.345 0.323 0.494
t-ratio 2.094 2.094 2.663 2.723 1.315 -0.832 0.059 -1.249 0.017 0.011 0.000 0.011 2.663 -0.331
41 coeff 0.603 0.289 1.017 1.687 0.889 -1.620 0.059 0.258 1.426 -0.384 -0.324 -0.227 1.017 -0.020
st dev 0.510 0.245 0.336 0.708 0.304 0.737 0.303 0.273 1.707 62.183 43.883 30.061 0.336 0.298
t-ratio 1.182 1.182 3.023 2.385 2.928 -2.198 0.194 0.945 0.836 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 3.023 -0.068
42 coeff 0.719 0.195 1.138 1.583 1.292 -1.545 -0.547 0.092 0.097 9.374 0.573 5.921 1.138 -0.155
st dev 0.324 0.088 0.335 0.332 0.119 0.338 0.132 0.110 0.370 50.326 6.743 29.420 0.335 0.073
t-ratio 2.220 2.220 3.403 4.772 10.819 -4.573 -4.144 0.838 0.262 0.186 0.085 0.201 3.403 -2.117
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors.
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E A Case Study: Firm Outcomes from the Removal of EU Quotas on
Textile and Apparel
In this Appendix we focus on a specific industry, “Textile and Apparel”, that experienced a rise in import
competition from China during our time frame. As a consequence of China joining the WTO a number of
quotas that were imposed at the EU-level on Chinese imports– as well as on imports from other non-WTO
countries– were removed. These quotas used to affect some products within the “Textile and Apparel”
industry but not others.
We show how the removal of quotas corresponds to a negative demand shock that forced firms to
reorganize. In particular, we show that firms that decrease the number of layers experience a reduction
in quantity-based productivity and an increase in revenue-based productivity. The data and estimation
strategy are borrowed from Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) to which the reader may refer for further
details. To provide some context, when these quotas were abolished this generated a 240% increase in
Chinese imports on average within the affected product groups. The underlying identifying assumption of
this strategy is that unobserved demand/technology shocks are uncorrelated with the strength of quotas to
non-WTO countries (like China) in 2000. Since these quotas were built up from the 1950s, and their phased
abolition negotiated in the late 1980s was in preparation for the Uruguay Round, Bloom, Draca, and Van
Reenen (2016) conclude that this seems like a plausible assumption.
Operationally we compute for each 6-digit Prodcom product category, the proportion of the more detailed
6-digit HS products that were covered by a quota, weighting each HS6 product by its share of EU15 imports
over the period 1995-1997. Then, for each firm, we measure the firm-level exposure to the quota by adding
each of the 6-digit Prodcom products weighted by the initial share of sales of the firm in that product. We
keep this sales shares constant. We label this variable QuotaCoveragei, and focus on the period 2000-2005.

























Figure E-1 shows the average number of layers for firms affected and not affected by the quota removals,
as a deviation from the common year average. The number of layers tend to increase for firms that were
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not affected by the quota removals, while it decreases for firms that were affected by the quota removals.
We use this relationship as a first stage in a 2SLS specification. Namely, we instrument the change in the
number of management layers with a fourth-order polynomial in QuotaCoveragei and the lagged number of
layers. For the structural quantity equation we treat the change in layers as endogeneous. In the structural
revenue-TFP regressions, we also consider the log of the markup in t as an additional endogeneous variable.
Table E-1 presents the results from the first stage. The sample is comprised of firms that were affected
by the changes in quotas applied to the “Textile and Apparel” industry as a consequence of China’s entry
into the WTO. We apply a trimming of 0.5 percent to the bottom and top of the distribution of TFPQ. As
we can see, the coeffi cients from the first stage are significant and with the expected sign. Table 9, in the
main text, reports IV estimates of the effect of the change in the number of layers on either revenue-based
or quantity based productivity as well as the OLS coeffi cients.
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Table E-1: Textile and Apparel, first stage
VARIABLES Chg layers (QTFP) Chg layers (RTFP) Markups (RTFP)
QuotaCoveraget (QC) 22.799b 18.599c 0.904
(9.34) (9.97) (1.78)
# of layers t-1 (Lt−1) 15.318b 13.819b -0.038
(6.82) (6.66) (1.62)
QC∗Lt−1 -26.615b -24.060b -1.392
(11.77) (11.78) (2.35)
QC squared -20.991 -12.151 1.384
(12.94) (13.96) (3.09)
Lt−1 squared -8.533b -7.799b 0.108
(3.57) (3.47) (0.86)
QC squared∗Lt−1 12.225b 10.648c 0.387
(5.90) (6.26) (1.29)
QC∗Lt−1 squared 11.419b 10.478b 0.367
(5.02) (4.90) (1.06)
QC cubed 6.62 -2.583a -0.615
(11.78) (12.75) (3.64)
Lt−1 cubed 1.441b 1.322b -0.026
(0.58) (0.56) (0.14)
QC to the power of four -0.009 3.436 -1.526
(4.69) (5.39) (1.77)
QC cubed∗Lt−1 -2.389 -1.806 0.925
(1.81) (1.88) (0.62)
QC∗Lt−1 cubed -1.714b -1.580b 0.001
(0.69) (0.67) (0.15)










(log) Capital first year 0.046a -0.019a
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 554 554
Kleibergen-Paap rk stat. 42.03 32.50
Firm-product-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.10
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F Additional Results
This section presents results where we estimate the parameters of the production function without taking
into account changes in layers.
Table F-1: Quantity-based TFP obtained without conditioning on changes in layers. OLS estimator with product
fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
QTFP t-1 0.894a 0.872a 0.905a 0.896a
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008)
Change in layers 0.027b 0.030b 0.024a
(0.011) (0.012) (0.007)
Constant -0.206a 0.114a 0.313b -0.013
(0.015) (0.033) (0.131) (0.031)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Adjusted R2 0.780 0.746 0.800 0.779
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table F-2: Quantity-based TFP obtained without conditioning on changes in layers. Dynamic panel data estimator
with firm-product-sequence fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
QTFP t-1 0.913a 0.880a 0.927a 0.910a
(0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.008)
Change in layers 0.036b 0.045b 0.061a
(0.016) (0.022) (0.016)
Constant -0.022a 0.125 0.385a 0.007
(0.006) (0.124) (0.118) (0.025)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Number of fixed effects 1,663 1,274 1,290 4,227
AR(2) Test Stat 0.536 0.097 2.391 1.919
P-value AR(2) 0.592 0.922 0.017 0.055
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
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Table F-3: Revenue-based TFP obtained without conditioning on changes in layers. OLS estimator with product
fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
RTFP t-1 0.940a 0.928a 0.956a 0.946a
(0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.010)
Change in layers -0.024a -0.031a -0.026a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Demand t-1 -0.023a -0.022a -0.025a -0.024a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Price t-1 0.010c 0.007 0.020a 0.013a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Log Markup 0.518a 0.484a 0.552a 0.518a
(0.035) (0.039) (0.057) (0.028)
Capital 0.003b 0.002 0.005b 0.003a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.279a 0.151a -0.244a 0.343a
(0.036) (0.044) (0.061) (0.037)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Adjusted R2 0.861 0.838 0.885 0.865
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Table F-4: Revenue-based TFP obtained without conditioning on changes in layers. Dynamic panel data estimator
results with firm-product-sequence fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Increasing Decreasing Constant All
RTFP t-1 0.947a 0.943a 0.965a 0.951a
(0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009)
Change in layers -0.021a -0.036a -0.026a
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Demand t-1 -0.007b -0.006b -0.009b -0.006a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Price t-1 -0.007 -0.013b 0.001 -0.007b
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Log Markup 0.086 0.026 0.094 0.041
(0.053) (0.068) (0.082) (0.037)
Capital 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -0.030a 0.000 0.018b -0.007a
(0.005) (0.000) (0.008) (0.002)
Observations 4,141 2,829 3,031 10,001
Number of fixed effects 1,663 1,274 1,290 4,227
AR(2) Test Stat 0.451 1.362 1.375 1.890
P-value AR(2) 0.652 0.173 0.169 0.059
Firm -level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year and Industry dumm ies are
included in the estim ations. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
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